STANLEY CAVANAUGH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Stanley Cavanaugh appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence for obtaining property in return for a worthless check. The appellate court affirms the trial court's denial, rejecting arguments that Cavanaugh was without counsel at his preliminary hearing, that counsel lacked adequate preparation time, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court held that none of Cavanaugh's claims had merit. The preliminary hearing was not a critical stage where counsel was required, counsel had constitutionally adequate time (nearly six weeks) to prepare, and Cavanaugh made no factual showing to support allegations of inadequate trial representation.
[1] A preliminary hearing is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings if no statements regarding guilt or innocence are made and nothing from the hearing is referenced du…
[2] A defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing is without merit if the hearing was not a critical stage of the proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Also it does not appear from the record brought here that the preliminary hearing in this case was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings against him.”
Establishes that the court requires a preliminary hearing to be a 'critical stage' to require counsel, and found none here.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCavanaugh was charged in October 1967 with obtaining property in return for a worthless check. He was arraigned on January 9, 1969, pleaded not guilty…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Stanley Cavanaugh, appellant herein, defendant in the trial Court, appeals to this Court from an order denying defendant's motion to vacate the judgment and sentence theretofore entered against him.
On October 27, 1967, Cavanaugh was informed against in the Pinellas County *517Circuit Court for the offense of obtaining property in return for a worthless check. On January 9, 1969, he was arraigned and entered plea of not guilty. Upon trial by jury he was found guilty as charged and, on March 3rd, 1969, was adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term in the State Prison.
On August 20, 1970, Cavanaugh filed in the trial Court a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence aforesaid, pursuant to CrPR 1.850. The primary thrust of the motion is that he was without counsel at his preliminary hearing, that later his counsel lacked sufficient time to adequately prepare for trial, and that he was ineptly represented at trial by his Court-appointed counsel. The trial Court summarily denied the motion and Cavanaugh has appealed to this Court. We affirm.
As to the preliminary hearing, the record shows that such hearing was held prior to the filing of the information, even though Cavanaugh had in fact waived preliminary hearing. Cavanaugh made no statement at the preliminary hearing as to his guilt or innocence. So far as the record shows there was not even a plea entered at that time. No reference was made during the trial to the preliminary hearing or anything that transpired at such hearing. Also it does not appear from the record brought here that the preliminary hearing in this case was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings against him. There is no merit in the allusion to a preliminary hearing. See Cameron v. State, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 182; Abbott v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 243; Brookins v. State, Fla.App.1965, 174 So.2d 578; Bell v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So.2d 28; Howard v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 229; Harrison v. Wainwright, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 427.
As to time for preparation for trial, the record shows that Cavanaugh’s trial counsel had almost a month and a half from the time of appointment to the time of trial within which to prepare. Cavanaugh was well represented in open Court at the time of his arraignment, almost two weeks before the trial. Such time was constitutionally adequate for preparation. At no time did Cavanaugh or his trial counsel ask for any continuance because of lack of time for preparation or upon any other ground. The record is completely devoid of any factual showing that his counsel had insufficient time to adequately prepare for trial.
Lastly, there is likewise no showing in the record to sustain any intimation that Cavanaugh was not properly or sufficiently represented by counsel at his trial. Innuendos or implications to the contrary cannot take the place of, or be equivalent to, factual allegations to support such charge.
Appellant Cavanaugh having failed to make a proper or sufficient showing in his petition for post-conviction relief, the trial Judge was eminently correct in denying the same. The order appealed here is therefore—
Affirmed.
LILES and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Harrison v. Louie L. Wainwright, 243 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Brookins v. State, 174 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Loyd Abbott v. State, 164 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- McCLENDON v. State, 164 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Ellis Howard v. State, 164 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Frazier Knight v. State, 164 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Cameron v. State, 196 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)