WILLIE WISE MAXWELL, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. INGA SUSAN HARDY AND TERRY NEAL HARDY, PETITIONERS, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. RONALD R. VANSCOLINA, PETITIONER, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. BRUCE HAYES, PETITIONER, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. WAYNE A. BRYANT, PETITIONER, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. DONALD ARTHUR HALES, PETITIONER, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. KIRK J. BENKEN, PETITIONER, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. JAMES BROWNING, PETITIONER, V. URIEL BLOUNT, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT
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Multiple petitioners sought writs of mandamus to compel a preliminary hearing after being charged by information without being held in custody for thirty days. The Florida District Court of Appeal denied the petitions, holding that preliminary hearings are not required when charges are brought by information, as the purpose of such hearings—determining probable cause—is satisfied by the prosecutorial decision to file an information.
Preliminary hearings are not required when charges are brought by information rather than indictment, as the filing of an information is sufficient evidence of probable cause and eliminates the need for a magistrate's determination on that issue. The same rule that applies to indictments applies equally to informations.
[1] A preliminary hearing is not required when a grand jury has returned an indictment.
[2] A preliminary hearing is not required when charges are filed by information.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“our federal courts uniformly have held that there is no necessity for a preliminary hearing after a grand jury has returned an indictment.”
Establishes the foundational federal principle that probable cause determination by grand jury eliminates need for preliminary hearing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEight petitioners were charged by informations rather than indictments and had not been held in custody for thirty days when they moved for preliminar…
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Petition for writ of mandamus requiring the respondent to provide a preliminary hearing for the petitioners, all of whom have been charged by informations and none of whom had been held in custody for thirty days at the time the respondent had denied motions for such hearings, is denied on authority of the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeal in Karz v. Overton, Case No. 71-339, filed May 14, 1971 not yet reported.
In addition to the authorities relied upon in Karz, supra, we think it noteworthy to observe that in Volume 1, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 80, Professor Wright, commenting upon proceedings before magistrates, states, at page 137:
“* * * jn many cases the issue is not when the examination is held but whether it must be held at all. It has recently been said that ‘our federal courts uniformly have held that there is no necessity for a preliminary hearing after a grand jury has returned an indictment.’ [Citing Crump v. Anderson, 1965, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 173, 352 F.2d 649.] For this proposition an abundance of authority may be cited. If the only purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether there is good cause for holding the defendant, this is an entirely logical rule. The grand jury has determined the issue of probable cause and there is no need to have a determination by the magistrate. Accordingly, it is held that where a person is first arrested after indictment, rather than on complaint, he is not entitled to a preliminary examination. * * * If he waives indictment and pleads guilty, he cannot complain of the lack of a preliminary examination. [Citing Fitts v. Willingham, C.A. 10th, 1966, 359 F.2d 790.] And finally, if he is first held on a complaint, but thereafter an indictment is returned, a preliminary examination need not be held, or, if it has been commenced, it need not be concluded, for the indictment is sufficient evidence of probable cause.”
While the cases cited by Professor Wright in support of the above proposition deal in the main with indictments, we hold the same rule to be equally applicable where the charges against the defendant are by information rather than indictment.
It is obvious from petitioners’ argumentation that the purpose for which preliminary hearings are being sought is to effect discovery. As pointed out by the court in Karz, supra, discovery can be effected under the liberal discovery provisions found in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. *659The discovery provisions therein are more liberal than those provided by any state in the Union except perhaps California. See this court’s opinion in Harrison v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 427, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in State of Florida v. Davis, 243 So.2d 587 (Fla.1971).
Our holding that preliminary hearings are not required if either an indictment has been returned or an information has been filed is consistent with the congressional view of the question as embodied in the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, inasmuch as that statute expressly provides that no preliminary hearing is required if an indictment is returned or an information is filed prior to a date which may already have been fixed for a preliminary hearing. See 18 U.S.C.A., Section 3060(e).
JOHNSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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State of Fla. ex rel. Inga Susan Hardy & Terry Neal Hardy v. Uriel Blount, Jr., 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972)…ADKINS, Justice. By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in these cases, (250 So. 2d 657), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (State ex rel. Shailer v. Booher, 241 So. 2d 720) on the same point of law. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4, F.S.A. The petitioner in each of the cases sub j…1 / 2
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Cameron v. State, 291 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…gainst him in a subsequent hearing or proceeding.” F.R.Cr.Pro. 3.122 has consistently been interpreted in Florida to not require a preliminary hearing where either an indictment or information was returned or filed. Maxwell v. Blount, Fla.App.1971, 250 So. 2d 657, aff’d Fla.1972, 261 So. 2d 175; State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, Fla. 1972, 261 So. 2d 172; Bradley v. State, Fla.App.1972, 265 So. 2d 532; Sangaree v. Hamlin, Fla.1970, 235 So. 2d 729; State v. Hernandez, Fla. 1968, 217 So. 2d 109; Palmieri v. State…
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Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)…The defendant’s counsel should not have asked for a speedy trial if he was not ready to go to trial. We see no error in this cause and the judgment and sentence are hereby affirmed. SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur. . Maxwell v. Blount, 250 So. 2d 657 (Fla.App.1st, 1971); State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1972).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1971)
- Harrison v. Louie L. Wainwright, 243 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
- Fitts v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1966)