J. L. MCCAIN
v.
F. L. ANDREWS AND CITY OF JACKSONVILLE
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J. L. McCain sued the City of Jacksonville and its fire investigator F. L. Andrews for malicious prosecution after being prosecuted for arson with intent to defraud insurance and acquitted. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of his complaint, holding that municipalities are not liable for torts committed by their officers while performing governmental functions such as police enforcement.
A municipal corporation is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents when they are performing strictly governmental duties such as police enforcement and prosecution. In this case, Andrews' duty to investigate fires and secure prosecutions was a governmental function to preserve the peace, not a corporate or ministerial function, and therefore the city is immune from liability.
“The duty imposed on Andrews was clearly that of preserving the peace. Police regulations are not imposed by the city in its corporate or ministrial capacity, but they are imposed in the interest of the people as a governmental function.”
Establishes that law enforcement duties are governmental functions performed in the public interest, not corporate functions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Jacksonville employed F. L. Andrews to investigate fires of incendiary origin and secure warrants for prosecution. Andrews investigated Mc…
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Plaintiff in error, J. L. McCain, instituted a common law action in the Civil Court of Record for Duval County against defendants in error to recover damages for *392malicious prosecution. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained and the cause was thereafter dismissed by the plaintiff. A new action was brought in the Circuit Court on the same ground, and the declaration was held bad on demurrer. Plaintiff declined to plead further, final judgment was entered for defendant and plaintiff took writ of error.
The sole question we are called on to answer is whether or not a municipal corporation is liable for the torts of its officers or agents committed in the exercise of a governmental function imposed in the interest of the public.
The plaintiff in error addresses the major portion of his brief to the question of the sufficiency of his declaration and relies on Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697; and Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147, to support his contention. He doesn’t say much about the real issue in the case.
The cases he relies on discuss the distinction between governmental and ministerial or corporate functions laid on a municipality, and point out that .these sometimes overlap, and can hardly be distinguished, but we do not understand them to hold that the municipality is liable for the torts of its agents when in the performance of strictly governmental duties.
In the case at bar we are not confronted with this difficulty. We have here a case in which the City of Jacksonville employed the defendant in error, F. L. Andrews, for the purpose of investigating fires of an incendiary origin and to secure warrants, and prosecute such as he deemed to be guilty. Under this authority, the plaintiff in error was on investigation by Andrews prosecuted for burning an automobile with intent to defraud an insurance company. *393The charge was dismissed by the trial court and he brought this action.
It is not charged that Andrews was not acting within the scope of his employment. It is charged that the prosecution was maliciously done, and that plaintiff was injured in’his name and business. There is no specification as to the manner in which he was injured. Neither is it charged that Andrews was acting for the city in its proprietary capacity.
The duty imposed on Andrews was clearly that of preserving the peace. Police regulations are not imposed by the city in its corporate or ministrial capacity, but they are imposed in the interest of the people as a governmental function. This Court is committed to the doctrine that the city is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the enforcement of such regulations. In the performance of such duties, the officers are not servants of the city, but agents of the public. It is sometimes difficult to determine the immunity of the municipality in these cases on account of the fact that the line of demarcation between a governmental and a proprietory function is so vague and indistinct, but not true in this case. This is the general rule which may have its exceptions, but the case at bar is not shown to be one.
The following cases support this view; Brown v. Town of Eustis, 92 Fla. 931; 110 So. 873, City of Orlando v. Pragg. 31 Fla. 111; 12 So. 368, Ballard v. City of Tampa, 124 Fla. 457; 168 So. 654; Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228; Phelps v. Dawson, 97 Fed. (2) 339, 19 R. C. L. Section 417, pages 1141-1142, Section 399, pages 1119-1120.
The judgment is affirmed.
*394Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur.
Terreli., C. J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
Justices Buford and Thomas not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
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Middleton v. City OF Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)…s entitled to redress for the wrong done.” Aside from the strict limitation imposed by the above quotation, it is important to-note that cases establishing' the immunity of a municipality from liability for malicious prosecution (McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616), or for wrongful exercise of legislative functions (Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, supra), or for wrongful exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions (Akin v. City of Miami Beach, supra), were not included in the Hargrove decisi…
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City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953)…orce agents of the municipality. [43 C.J. 964].” The doctrine of municipal immunity for tortious acts committed by employees engaged in " governmental functipns is derived from the common law which was adopted by the Legislature. McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616; Swanson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 155 Fla. 720, 21 So. 2d 217; Bradley v. City of Jacksonville, 156 Fla. 493, 23 So. 2d 626. Also see 38 Am.Jur. 265, 272, 317. Hence, if the doctrine is to be altered, the responsibility for such chan…
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Calbeck v. Town OF S. Pasadena, 128 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)…ove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, supra, said: ■ “Aside from the strict limitation imposed by the above quotation, it is important to note that cases establishing the immunity of a municipality from liability for malicious prosecution (McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616) or for wrongful exercise of legislative functions (Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, supra), or for wrongful exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions (Akin v. City of Miami Beach, supra), were not included in the Hargrove decisio…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kaufman v. The City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634 (Fla. 1922)
- Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (Fla. 1924)
- Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675 (Fla. 1938)
- Brown v. The Town of Eustis, 92 Fla. 931 (Fla. 1926)
- Ballard v. City of Tampa, 124 Fla. 457 (Fla. 1936)
- The City of Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla. 111 (Fla. 1893)