STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT STANLEY CUSTER, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals from a suppression order after marijuana was discovered during a consent search of defendant Custer's vehicle. The court reverses, holding that the consent search was valid and that Miranda warnings do not apply to consent searches.
The consent search was valid and the evidence should not have been suppressed. Miranda warnings do not apply to consent searches, and voluntariness of consent does not require Fourth Amendment advisories. Additionally, once voluntary consent is given to search an entire area, any contraband found within that area may be seized regardless of the scope of the original purpose.
[1] A voluntary consent to search an automobile and the voluntary surrender of the keys constitutes a waiver of any right to challenge the legality of the search or the admis…
[2] Advising a suspect of their right to refuse consent to a search is not required to validate the consent or establish its voluntariness.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a consent to search an automobile and voluntarily turning over the keys for that purpose is a waiver of any right to complain thereafter about the legality of the search or to protest that the evidence found as a result of the search may be inculpatory in a subsequent criminal prosecution”
Establishes the fundamental principle that consent search with key surrender waives Fourth Amendment protections
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 14, 1970, a sheriff's office received a report of a purse snatching with descriptions of suspects and an unusually decorated car. A deputy sto…
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The state appeals pursuant to F.S. § 924.-071, 1969, F.S.A., from an interlocutory order suppressing certain evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure. We reverse.
It undisputedly appears that on July 14, 1970 the Manatee County sheriff’s office received a report of a purse snatching. The general description of the suspects and a specific description of an unusually decorated car were given. Subsequently, on the same day, a deputy sheriff stopped a vehicle which matched the description of the aforesaid car and asked the occupants to accompany him to the sheriff’s office for questioning. The defendant herein, Custer, was the driver of the car and both he and his sole passenger agreed to go to the sheriff’s office. Though not under arrest, upon arrival at the sheriff’s office both of the occupants were given “Miranda” advice, and thereafter they denied stealing the purse. During the course of the aforesaid interrogation a deputy sheriff asked permission to search the car for the missing purse. Custer granted permission to search the car and handed the deputy the keys. No limitations were made on the areas to be searched, and marijuana was found upon the consequent search.
It is well settled, of course, that a consent to search an automobile and voluntarily turning over the keys for that purpose is a waiver of any right to complain thereafter about the legality of the search or to protest that the evidence found as a result of the search may be inculpatory in a subsequent criminal prosecution.1 Custer argues first, however, that the consent was not voluntarily given since he was not fully advised, by the Miranda advice given, as to his rights under the Fourth Amendment relating to searches and seizures; and secondly, that in any event he only gave consent to search for the purse and not for marijuana actually found. Both contentions are patently untenable.
As to the first, the mandate of Miranda 2 is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case. Advising one of his right of refusal to consent to a search is not required to validate that consent or to prima facie establish the voluntariness thereof.3
Concerning, now, the contention that consent was given to search only for the purse, we hold that a voluntary consent to search a given area cannot limit the fruits of a search thereof. Once consent was given to search the entire automobile *289any contraband found therein was subject to seizure.4
We conclude, therefore, that the search herein was purely and simply a classic “consent search,” and it was error to suppress the fruits thereof. Accordingly, the order appealed from should be, and the same is hereby, reversed.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and MANN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…s on the issue of voluntariness. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 217, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Othen, 300 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); State v. Spanierman, 267 So. 2d 102 (Fla.2d DCA 1972); State v. Custer, 251 So. 2d 287 (Fla.2d DCA 1971). In the context of this case, such a factor takes on particular significance in view of the illegal search which preceded the defendant’s alleged consent to search. Such an advisement by the officer given prior to the challenged co…
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Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ered by the trial court in assessing the totality of the circumstances on the question of volun-tariness, in ruling on the motion to suppress. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra; State v. Spanierman, 267 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); State v. Custer, 251 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The absence of such advance advice to the defendant was emphasized in the testimony of the defendant, thereby acquainting the court with that circumstance. In holding that…
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Brady Otis Byrd v. State, 380 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…lity of all the circumstances that consent was voluntarily given. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Accord, State v. Custer, 251 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Dykman v. State, 300 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. den., 312 So. 2d 742 (Fla.1975). After the officer was legally inside the car, he could validly seize contraband seen by him in plain view, State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668 (Fla. 1946)
- James v. State, 223 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- United States v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970)
- Bretti v. State, 192 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)