JOE'S CREEK INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LOYAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, AN INSURANCE COMPANY, AND W. S. AULD, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1971-06-25
No. 70-627
LILES, Acting C. J., and MANN, J., concur.
251 So. 2d 348 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1971) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Joe's Creek Industrial Park appeals a summary judgment denying recovery on a life insurance policy issued to its lessee Bertrand, who died within the contestability period. The court affirms that material misrepresentations regarding Bertrand's undisclosed diabetic condition were made, but reverses the summary judgment because genuine issues of fact remain regarding whether the insurer relied on those misrepresentations and whether the insurer had knowledge that would constitute waiver or estoppel.


Holding

While the misrepresentations regarding the nondisclosed diabetic condition and doctor consultations are material and sufficient to bar recovery as a matter of law, the summary judgment must be reversed because the insurer failed to establish a record excluding all inferences contrary to its assertion of reliance, and material issues of fact remain regarding reliance and waiver/estoppel.


Headnotes

[1] Material misrepresentations in an insurance application concerning health conditions are sufficient as a matter of law to bar recovery under Florida law.

[2] An insurance company seeking to deny coverage based on material misrepresentations must establish a record sufficient to exclude all inferences contrary to its assertion…

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“It was, of course, the burden of Loyal American to establish a record sufficient to exclude all inferences contrary to its assertion of reliance.”

Establishes that the insurer bears the burden of proving reliance on misrepresentations at summary judgment.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Bertrand procured life insurance to secure his lease with Joe's Creek Industrial Park. Approximately one month before his final insurance application,…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
McNULTY, Judge.

McNULTY, Judge.

The decedent Bertrand contracted to, and did, procure life insurance for the benefit of, and to secure his lease with, the appellant Industrial Park. The issues in the case are whether he withheld or concealed material information relating to health in his application for insurance with appellee Loyal American, and/or whether Loyal American is chargeable, by waiver or estoppel, with knowledge of such matters. Loyal American denied coverage, Bertrand having died within the contesti-bility period, and this suit followed resulting in a summary judgment in favor of Loyal American.

In entering the summary judgment, the trial judge correctly found that the decedent made material misrepresentations in his final application for insurance. These misrepresentations concerned nondisclosure of a diabetic condition, which had been diagnosed approximately a month before the final application for insurance, and nondisclosure of the doctor’s consultations resulting in that diagnosis. Bertrand failed to disclose these matters notwithstanding that the application form asked for the information. The trial judge further found these misrepresentations sufficient as a matter of law to bar appellant’s recovery *349under § 627.01081, F.S.A. We agree that the misrepresentations are material ones sufficient to bar recovery, but must reverse the summary judgment because material issues of fact remain as to whether the insurance company relied on the misrepresentations.

It was, of course, the burden of Loyal American to establish a record sufficient to exclude all inferences contrary to its assertion of reliance.1 This it failed to do. First, the evidence viewed most favorably to appellant leaves considerable question as to whether the final application form was received, and thus relied on, by the insurance company before issuance of the policy.2 Secondly, there remained a triable issue as to whether the insurance company had actual or constructive knowledge of the nondisclosed matters otherwise, thus constituting a waiver or estoppel to assert misrepresentation.3 For example, at the time the summary judgment was entered there was a pending motion for discovery of reports concerning decedent made to Loyal American by two investigating agencies. Such reports are still not in the record of this case and hence there remains the question of matters within the actual or constructive knowledge of Loyal American which could operate for a waiver or estoppel. The summary judgment in favor of Loyal American must be reversed.

Now, Joe’s Creek also appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the appellee Auld, who was the insurance agent who procured the disputed policy. Auld was sued jointly with Loyal American for negligently failing to procure a valid life insurance policy. We agree with the trial judge that, as to defendant Auld, no material issues remain, and we consequently affirm the summary judgment as to him.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

LILES, Acting C. J., and MANN, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • N. Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Cent. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 419 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …less it has actual or constructive knowledge that such representations are incorrect or untrue. Hardy v. American Southern Life Insurance Company, 211 So. 2d 559 (Fla.1968); Joe’s Creek Industrial Park, Inc. v. Loyal American Life Insurance Company, 251 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). In this case, the mere fact that Teachman may have appeared “stooped over” to the Insur [*803] er’s agents4 did not put the Insurer on notice that further inquiry was necessary. New York Life Insurance Company v. Nespereira, supr…
  • Nembhard v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 326 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw