RUSSELL DEANE CARTER, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks reversal of an order denying a motion to vacate judgment and sentence filed pursuant to Rule 1.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A. Initially charged with first degree murder, appellant pled guilty to the lesser included offense of manslaughter and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of twenty years.

Our consideration of the record on appeal, briefs submitted by the parties and oral argument heard thereon leads us to conclude that the trial court correctly denied appellant’s motion to vacate. The colloquy between the court and appellant and his counsel at the time the guilty plea to the lesser offense was accepted by the court amply demonstrates that appellant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. Appellant’s statement to the trial court that he was entering his guilty plea because he had no witnesses and “ * * * didn’t see any way he could beat the charge of first degree murder or possibly second degree. * * * ” after he had discussed his case with counsel leaves little room for the belated contention that the court violated his constitutional rights when it accepted the plea of guilty. Accordingly, the order reviewed herein is

Affirmed.

*732SPECTOR, C. J., CARROLL, DONALD K., and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

SPECTOR, Chief Judge.

Appellant has filed his motion for rehearing contending as grounds therefor that this court failed to consider a point raised on appeal in the rendition of our decision filed October 5, 1971.

The point which appellant contends we overlooked asserts that the court below erred by failing to comply with Rule 1.720, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring that the trial court inform the defendant at the time the sentence is to be pronounced of the accusation against him and of the judgment, and further that defendant be asked by the court whether he has any cause to show why sentence should not be pronounced.

As stated in our decision, the sentence imposed upon appellant resulted from a plea bargain. No case is cited by appellant which holds that Rule 1.720 is applicable in a plea bargaining situation. Indeed, it seems to us that the purpose of Rule 1.720 and the related rule, 1.780, is in fact accomplished by plea bargaining negotiations as a result of which the charges against the defendant are reduced in exchange for defendant’s plea of guilty to the lesser charges. We hold that failure to comply with Rules 1.720 and 1.780 is not reversible error where the sentence complained of results from obvious plea bargaining. In such circumstances, noncompliance is harmless error.

Rehearing denied.

CARROLL, DONALD K., and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.