STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL., ROBERT CHARLES SHELTON, RELATOR,
v.
HONORABLE ALFONSO SEPE, AS JUDGE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 3d DCA | 1971-10-21
No. 71-546
Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and BARKDULL, JJ.
254 So. 2d 12 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1971) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Holding

A judge's public pronouncement of a sentencing policy, consistent with existing law, does not create a reasonable fear of an unfair trial and is not grounds for disqualification.


Headnotes

[1] A judge's public pronouncement of a sentencing policy for certain offenses, if it indicates bias, can operate to disqualify the judge from hearing those matters.

[2] A judge's public statement regarding sentencing policy does not create a reasonable basis for a defendant to fear an unfair trial if the statement deals only with matters…

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Facts & Procedural History

Relator sought a writ of prohibition, alleging a judge's public statement about sentencing policy for marijuana offenses would prevent a fair trial. T…

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Opinion of the Court
CARROLL, Judge.

CARROLL, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in prohibition. By an information the relator was charged in two counts with sale of marijuana, and in two counts with possession of the drug, in violation of § 398.03 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. In the suggestion in prohibition the relator alleged the respondent judge, before whom his cause is pending, had made a public pronouncement of a policy for confinement of persons convicted of said offenses, and that by reason thereof he feared he would not receive a fair trial; and that relator’s motion for disqualification of the judge filed pursuant to Rule 1.230 CrPR, 33 F.S.A. had been denied. This court issued a rule nisi in prohibition. In response thereto the respondent admitted the alleged public statement, but pointed out that the policy stated was consistent with the provisions of the law with reference to penalty for such offenses, following conviction, and that the statement did not have reference to trial of such offenses. The cause has been considered by this court on arguments of counsel and on the record and briefs.

A public pronouncement by a judge of his attitude regarding certain offenses for which persons will be tried before him and of a policy to be pursued by him regarding sentencing therefor is, at the least, ill advised. When a public statement so made is such as to indicate bias of the judge it can operate to disqualify him from hearing those matters, and could impair his usefulness proportionately. However, it is our conclusion and we so hold that the respondent judge’s public pronouncement in this instance was not such as to bring about those results.

We reach this conclusion because the judge’s statement, dealing only with matters after conviction, was not such as would form a reasonable basis for a defendant to fear that he would not receive a fair trial;1 and, as to the statement regarding disposition following conviction, because the policy stated by the judge, that is, to confine defendants convicted of such offenses, was in conformity to the law which then so provided.

At the time the public pronouncement of policy was made by the respondent judge the penalty for the offense of selling the drug, a felony, was confinement in the state prison for a period of years (with authority to impose a fine in addition thereto but not as an alternative to confinement). § 398.22(1) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Likewise, as to the offense of unlawful possession of the drug, a felony, the penalty provided by *14law was for a period of confinement without an alternative of a fine, with the exception that for a first conviction thereof the statute provided the penalties of imprisonment or a fine, in the alternative. § 398.22(2) (a) Fla.Stat., F.S.A.2 We need not express opinion on whether the fact that the judge’s statement of policy for confinement related also to a first conviction of possession should disqualify him in such a case, because it was not alleged or shown that if the relator should be convicted of the crime of possession of marijuana it would constitute a first conviction for such offense.3

We hold to be without merit the contention of the relator that disqualification of the respondent judge should result from the fact that the respondent was employed as an assistant state attorney at the time the relator was bound over to the criminal court of record. It was disclosed that the respondent, while so acting as assistant state attorney, had no dealings or contact with the prosecution proceeding involving the relator. Compare State ex rel. Ambler v. Hocker, 34 Fla. 25, 15 So. 581.

Accordingly, the rule nisi is discharged and the application for writ of prohibition is denied.

It is so ordered.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Hayes v. State, 686 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …the low end of appellant’s guidelines sentencing range was more than five years in state prison, appellant demonstrated that he was in the class of violators who might be affected by the judge’s bias. Cf. State ex rel. State ex rel. Shelton v. Sepe, 254 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). As the court stated in Shelton: A public pronouncement by a judge of his attitude regarding certain offenses for which persons will be tried before him and of a policy to be pursued by him regarding sentencing therefor is, at th…
  • Martin v. State, 804 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
    …an a statement of personal philosophy. His public pronouncement indicated his bias in refusing to consider a sentencing option that was among the range of sentencing options available to him in appellant’s case. Cf. [State ex rel.] Shelton [v. Sepe, 254 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) ]. Thus, Judge Goldstein’s comment concerned the ultimate disposition of appellant’s case. 686 So. 2d at 696. In Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), the defendant’s departure sentence was reversed and the…
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  • Eason v. Colbath, 586 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
    …RIAM. We deny the petition for a writ of prohibition, concluding that the trial judge’s quoted comments were not such “as would form a reasonable basis for a defendant to fear that he would not receive a fair trial.” State ex rel. Shelton v. Sepe, 254 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla.3d DCA 1971). We also conclude that the trial judge’s quoted statements were merely generalized and not directed to any single defendant appearing before him. Compare State ex rel. La Russa v. Himes, 144 Fla. 145, 197 So. 762 (1940), with S…

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