FRANK J. ROONEY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FOOD FAIR INDUSTRIES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEE; LATHROP DOUGLASS, APPELLANT, V. FOOD FAIR INDUSTRIES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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A contractor and architect appealed an order compelling arbitration in a construction dispute with a property owner. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision, holding that both parties were contractually bound to arbitrate and that the arbitration clause had not expired by lapse of time.
The court affirmed the order compelling arbitration. The contractor could not avoid arbitration by arguing it bore no liability—that goes to the merits, not the court's jurisdiction to compel arbitration. The arbitration clause had not expired; the only time limitation was that demand be made within a reasonable time after discovery of the dispute, and the record showed continued negotiation and remedial work without unreasonable delay.
[1] A court may not refuse to compel arbitration on the ground that the claim lacks merit or bona fides.
[2] A court's role in compelling arbitration is not to determine the merits of the underlying dispute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown.”
Establishes that the trial court cannot refuse arbitration based on the merits of the underlying claim, rejecting the contractor's argument that it had no liability.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrank J. Rooney, Inc., a contractor, and Lathrop Douglass, an architect, brought separate suits to enjoin arbitration proceedings initiated by Food Fa…
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These appeals are all from the same order. Both the contractor, Frank J. Rooney, Inc. and the architect, Lathrop Douglass, have filed an interlocutory and a full appeal from the order of the trial judge which granted appellee’s motion to compel arbitration.
The appellant Frank J. Rooney, Inc. was a plaintiff in the trial court. Rooney brought a suit to enjoin arbitration proceedings. The architect Lathrop Douglass also filed a suit to enjoin the arbitration. Upon the consolidation of the actions, the appellee Food Fair Industries, Inc. brought a motion pursuant to F.S. § 682.03, F.S.A., The Florida Arbitration Code, to compel arbitration. The trial court had before it the relevant contractual documents as ex*31hibits to appellants’ complaints to enjoin arbitration. The trial judge determined that the dispute was properly one which the parties were required to arbitrate under the contractual documents. We affirm.
Appellants’ objections come under two points. The first point urges that the contractor Rooney cannot be required to arbitrate because the owner’s claim is exclusively against the architect. In essence, this point urges that appellant Rooney has no liability. This goes to the merits of the arbitration and under the language of The Florida Arbitration Code it is not a matter to be determined in the circuit court.
“F.S. § 682.03, F.S.A. Proceedings to compel and to stay arbitration
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(5) An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown.”
Appellant’s second point urges that the court erred in ordering arbitration because the time limit for the invocation of the arbitration clause had passed. The history of this dispute as reflected by the record is one of continued negotiation, contractual agreements, remedial work, and finally a demand for arbitration. Appellant relies upon sections 2.2.6, 2.2.7 and 2.-2.10 of the original contract between the parties, which was an AIA form contract, as a time limitation upon arbitration. He cites no authority so construing these sections. A reading of the sections does not suggest error in the trial court’s failure to enforce these sections as a limitation upon the time for application for arbitration. The reading of the contract as a whole convinces us, as it did the trial judge, that the only time limitation as to the' right of arbitration is that the demand should be made within a reasonable time after the discovery of the dispute.
Having examined the record in the light of the briefs and oral argument and finding error has not been shown, the order appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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The Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. M.R. Harrison Constr. Corp., 415 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…denial of an untimely motion to compel arbitration; that in Bickerstaff v. Frazier, 232 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), upon which we relied in Lyons, the First District did the same; and that in Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Food Fair Industries, Inc., 254 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), we affirmed an order compelling arbitration which was timely sought. But none of these cases addressed or decided the apparently unraised question which is now, for the first time, squarely before us — that is, in respect to an a…
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Fortune Ins. Co. v. Everglades Diagnostics, Inc., 721 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…denied, 378 So. 2d 346 (Fla.1979) (contract specified that demand for arbitration shall be made within time limits specified in contract where applicable and otherwise within reasonable time); and Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Food Fair Industries, Inc., 254 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (only time limitation in contract to demand arbitration was reasonable time after discovery of dispute). In this instance whether the time for demanding arbitration be a reasonable time, or instead any time during the applicable s…