EDWIN M. L'ENGLE, RESPONDENT,
v.
THE FLORIDA CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court order that partially denied a motion to vacate a receivership over the Florida Central Railroad Company. The court held that when all parties in interest consent to vacating a receivership, the receiver must be fully divested of control, including over future earnings and disbursements.
The trial court erred in partially granting the motion. When all parties in interest consent to vacating a receivership, the entire order must be vacated, and full possession, management, and control of the property—including the receipt and disbursement of future earnings—must be restored to the owner.
“The motion was to vacate, and being concurred in by all parties in interest, should have been granted so far as to restore the possession, management and control of the road to the owner, and such control should manifestly include the receipt and disbursement of its future earnings.”
Establishes the core holding that vacating a receivership with consent of all parties requires complete restoration of control, including earnings management.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant railroad company, with the plaintiff's consent, moved to vacate an order appointing a receiver. The trial court granted the motion in pa…
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delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a part of an order made by the court below on March 27th, 1873, upon a motion of the defendant, consented to by the plaintiff, to vacate an order previously made appointing a receiver. No opposition was made to the motion except by the receiver himself. The court partly granted the motion, and partly refused it, grant*267ing it so far as to require the receiver to restore the railroad, its appurtenances and management to the company, and refusing it sb far as to require the receiver still to receive and disburse its earnings and incomes. In this the court erred. The motion was to vacate, and being concurred in by all parties in interest, should have been granted so far as to restore the possession, management and control of the* road to the owner, and such control should manifestly include the receipt and disbursement of its future earnings.
The receiver should not have been heard in opposition to this motion. He is not a party in interest. He has no stand-' ing in court for such purpose. “ He has no right to inter-meddle in questions affecting the rights of the parties or the-disposition of the property in his hands.” 3 Md. Ch. Rep. 303. When his accounts come up for adjustment, his relations will be different. He will then be a party in interest, and may be heard, and it will be the duty of the court to see that his rights are fully protected.
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the order of the court below of 27th March, 1873, so far as it directs the "receiver, James M. Baker, to continue to receive and disburse the future earnings and incomes of said Florida Central Railroad Company, be reversed and set aside, and the cause-remanded to the court below for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Bloxham v. Fla. Cent. & Peninsular R.R. Co., 35 Fla. 625 (Fla. 1895)
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In re Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution of Fredcris, 108 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)…ve been most happy to receive a fee of $1,000.00, or less, on obtaining the same results, if it was not for all this litigation incurred by Sibley and Davis for the stockholder Sally Frankel.” In the case of L’Engle v. Florida Central Railroad Co., 14 Fla. 266, it was held that a receiver was not a party in interest to be heard upon a motion to vacate an order previously made appointing him receiver. The Court observed: “He [the receiver] has no right to intermeddle in questions affecting the lights of th…
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Urban C. Herndon v. Hurter, 19 Fla. 397 (Fla. 1882)