WALTER L. GODSHALL, PETITIONER,
v.
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, AND JEAN RUMSEY, FORMERLY JEAN BEIERMEISTER, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that an insurance company cannot be severed from a negligence lawsuit unless there is a justiciable issue relating to insurance coverage, such as a coverage dispute or policy interpretation question. The Court quashed the District Court's affirmance of severance and remanded the case, finding the severance improper where no insurance issue existed.
An insurance company defendant cannot be severed from a case absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a coverage dispute or question concerning the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy. Severance is discretionary under the civil procedure rules, but absent such a valid insurance issue, it should not be granted.
[1] A severance of an insurance company from a lawsuit should not be granted absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question of coverage, interpretation…
[2] A motion to sever filed in the trial court is part of the record proper for appellate review of a per curiam decision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, there is no valid reason for a severance and it should NOT be granted.”
The Court's clear statement of the legal standard governing when insurance defendants may be severed from litigation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGodshall sued defendant driver Jean Rumsey and her insurer, Unigard Insurance Company, for injuries from an automobile accident. Unigard moved to seve…
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By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 875, which petitioner contends conflicts with the decision of this Court in Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla.1971), opinion filed October 20, 1971, on the same point of law. Certiorari is granted without oral argument. Fla.Const. Art. V, § 4, F.S.A.
Petitioner, plaintiff-below, sued defendant driver and her insurance company, respondent herein, and alleged injuries resulting from an automobile accident. Respond*681ent insurance company filed a motion to sever with the trial court and alleged as grounds for this severance,
“. . . there is no issue between the plaintiff and Unigard Insurance Company that is not identical to the issues involved in the case of the plaintiff against Joan Rumsey. The defendants agree that to the extent of the limits of the liability policy mentioned in the complaint which was- issued by Unigard Insurance Co. to Jean Rumsey, formerly Jean Beiermeister, the plaintiff may have judgment against Unigard Insurance Co. for any such sum of money for which Jean Rumsey is found to be liable to the plaintiff, if any; . . .”
Upon such motion, respondent was severed from the case. The trial court entered a final judgment for defendant-below, Jean Rumsey, on a jury verdict. Petitioner appealed and the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Per Curiam affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Respondent’s motion to sever, filed in the circuit court, is part of the “record proper” of the Per Curiam decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal as defined by this Court in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221, and therefore it has been taken into consideration in determining that conflict does exist between the District Court’s opinion and our decision of Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra.
In Stecher, this Court clarified its holding as to the right of an insurance company to severance as had been previously enunciated in Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163. This Court stated,
“. . . To be sure our opinion in Beta Eta employs the permissive ‘may’ in holding that the trial judge may grant a severance of a named insurance defendant. This is lifted from the rule regarding severances, is consistent with it and was used expressly in the context of the rule (1.270 [b], 30 F.S.A.). The exact reference (p. 165) was ‘pursuant to’ the rule.
“There is good reason for this adaptation of Civil Procedure Rule 1.270(b) in Beta Eta. There are some instances where there is a question of coverage when a severance would be quite proper to try those issues separately, and the severance would be under this rule, as there pointed out. However, the remainder of that opinion holds, and we hereby reaffirm, that absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, there is no valid reason for a severance and it should NOT be granted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent from the record proper that there was no issue in the case sub judice relating to insurance such as either coverage or interpretation of the insurance policy.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is hereby quashed and the cause is remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s opinion in Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
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Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973)…th District, is quashed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur. . 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1971). . 252 So. 2d 875 (Fla.App. 4th 1971). . 255 So. 2d 680 (Fla.1971). . Id. at 681, quoting from Steicker v. Pomeroy, supra, 253 So. 2d at 424. (Emphasis appearing in both opinions.) . 267 So. 2d at 386-387. (Citations omitted.) . See note 3, supra. . 253 So. 2d at 424. . Id. at 423. . 255 So. 2d at…
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Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 267 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)…nd plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment. On 23 September 1971 this court affirmed the final judgment (see 252 So. 2d 875). The plaintiff then applied to the Florida Supreme Court for a review of our decision. The Florida Supreme Court, 255 So. 2d 680, found a conflict between our decision and its “decision” in Stecher v. Pomeroy, Fla.1971, 253 So. 2d 421. As a result, our decision was quashed and the cause remanded to this court for. reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ste…
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Barrett v. Dottie Delores Gill & State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, there is no valid reason for a severance and it should not be- granted.” Also see Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Company, 255 So. 2d 680 (Fla.1971). The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in severing State Farm. We, therefore, grant certiorari and quash the order severing State Farm. This case is remanded for further appropriate action. BOYER, C. J., and ER…
Authorities Cited
- Clearwater Elks Club, Inc. v. Gussie Catrett & Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970)
- In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971)
- Miller v. J. I. Kislak Mortg. Corp. of Fla., 252 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)