ROGER R. MARTIN, APPELLANT,
v.
HENRIETTA A. MARTIN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A divorced husband sought to modify his alimony and child support obligations but was summarily denied a hearing because he was in arrears on payments. The court held that arrears alone do not deprive a husband of standing to petition for modification; rather, the court must determine whether the arrears resulted from inability to pay beyond his control or from willful neglect before denying him a hearing on the merits.
A husband in arrears on alimony is not automatically deprived of standing to seek modification. However, if he has the ability to pay the arrearage and fails to do so, he lacks clean hands and the court may deny his petition. Conversely, if the arrearage is due to inability to pay for reasons beyond his control, he should be allowed a hearing on the merits of his modification petition.
[1] A party seeking modification of alimony or child support is not automatically deprived of standing in court due to arrearages in payments.
[2] A court may deny a petition to modify alimony or child support on the merits if the petitioner is in arrears and has the ability to pay but has failed to do so.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The mere fact that a husband is in arrears under an alimony order does not, ipso facto, deprive him of standing in a court of equity to seek a modification of such alimony order.”
Establishes the core holding that arrears alone do not eliminate standing to petition for modification.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoger Martin filed a petition to modify alimony and child support provisions of a final divorce judgment entered three years earlier. At the time of f…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Unclean Hands Doctrine cases and more on FLexlaw
Pursuant to the provision of Section 61.-14, F.S.1969, F.S.A., appellant filed in the circuit court his petition to modify the alimony and child support provisions of a final judgment of divorce entered some three years earlier. At the time of filing the petition appellant was in arrears in payment of support and alimony in the amount of approximately $4,273.66. When the petition came on for hearing a few days after being filed, the court summarily denied appellant a hearing on the petition because of such arrearage.
The mere fact that a husband is in arrears under an alimony order does not, ipso facto, deprive him of standing in a court of equity to seek a modification of such alimony order. Clearly, if the husband has the ability to pay such arrearage and does not do so, whether wilfully or neglectfully, he is not in court with clean hands and in such case his petition should not be considered on the merits until he has complied with the former order by payment of the sums due thereunder. Blanton v. Blanton, 1944, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So.2d 902. Contrarywise, where the husband can show that the arrearage is due to an inability to pay for reasons not within his control or of his making, he should not be deprived of access to a court of equity to be heard on the merits of his petition. Blanton v. Blanton, supra; English v. English, Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 559; Mack v. Mack, Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 447; Watson v. McDowell, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 680. Otherwise, an impecunious husband, once in arrears, would likely find himself ever increasingly so by the burden placed upon him while paradoxically increasingly less likely to ever have access to the court for appropriate relief.
Appellant’s petition for modification, while somewhat lacking in specificity, nonetheless alleged his inability to make payments specified under the order sought to be modified, and alleged a change in circumstance of the parties since the entry of such order, thus presenting a prima facie case entitling him to be heard on the merits. If at hearing it develops factually that appellant has the ability to pay the arrearage, or that his inability to pay has been purposely brought about by some intentional conduct on his part, the court then, upon making a finding of such fact from the evidence before it, may properly invoke the clean hands doctrine and refuse to entertain the petition on its merits.
The order appealed is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
REED, C. J., and MAGER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…tified. See 10A Fla.Jur., Dissolution of Marriage, sec. 322. A spouse’s inability to pay occasioned by matters within the spouse’s control or choice suggests an entry into a court of equity with unclean hands. E. g., Martin v. Martin, Fla.App. 1972, 256 So. 2d 553. The husband’s petition to modify was predicated essentially upon his representation that since the entry of the final judgment and the order granting the wife temporary relief he had filed a petition in bankruptcy; that he was not presently practi…
-
Feder v. Feder, 291 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…not have been entertained while such default by him continued. Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So. 2d 902, 904; Watson v. McDowell, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 680, 682; Mack v. Mack, Fla.App. 1959, 115 So. 2d 447; Martin v. Martin, Fla.App.1972, 256 So. 2d 553. The order modifying the judgment is reversed.…
-
Bock v. Bock, 336 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…ack alimony and that he willfully refused to do so. Once this determination was made, the husband was not entitled to have his claim for modification considered. Feder v. Feder, Fla.App.3rd, 1974, 291 So. 2d 641; Martin v. Martin, Fla.App.4th, 1972, 256 So. 2d 553. The husband’s contentions with respect to the attorney’s fees are without merit. AFFIRMED. HOBSON, A. C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Blanton v. Oneida Langley Blanton, 154 Fla. 750 (Fla. 1944)
- English v. English, 117 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Josie Lee Watson v. McDOWELL, 110 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Mack v. Mack, 115 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)