GERTRUDE BEVERETTE, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNIE GRAHAM, AND HER HUSBAND, THADDEUS GRAHAM, ABNER BURTON AND JULIUS BURTON AND HIS WIFE, MRS. JULIUS BURTON, APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior decision reversing a lower court's decree, clarifying that a bill of complaint sworn to by a solicitor, not the complainant, might not render a final decree void for collateral attack purposes if proper objections were not timely raised.
The court reaffirmed its prior decision reversing the cause. It clarified that such a decree is not necessarily void for collateral attack, especially if timely objections were not raised by the defendants.
“Nothing in the previous opinion which is here reaffirmed [*567] should be construed as a holding by this Court that a bill of complaint sworn to by the solicitor and not by the complainants, for the partition of real estate, renders a final decree based thereon void to the extent that the decree may be collaterally attacked, even by defendants who are brought in as parties to such suit by constructive process based on such bill.”
Clarification of the court's stance on the voidability of decrees based on solicitor-sworn complaints.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involved an appeal from a decree related to a partition of real estate. A prior opinion by this court had reversed the decree and remanded th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Opinion was filed in this case on March 5, 1931, in which the decree appealed from ’was Reversed and-the cause remanded with leave to the complainant to bring a new suit without prejudice.
On motion, rehearing • was granted .and thereafter appellant submitted further brief which has been considered, together with the record and former briefs submitted.
Nothing in the previous opinion which is here reaffirmed *567should be construed as a holding by this Court that a bill of complaint sworn to by the solicitor and not by the complainants, for the partition of real estate, renders a final decree based thereon void to the extent that the decree may be collaterally attacked, even by defendants who are brought in as parties to such suit by constructive process based on such bill. It has been held that a court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject matter, and of the parties, but that it is still limited in its mode of procedure and in the extent and character of its judgment which may not be rendered in violation of the prescribed modes of procedure, as against those who raise proper and timely objections to the decree when so made. Johnson v. McKinnon, 54 Fla. 221, 45 So. 23.
It is now ordered and adjudged that the opinion and judgment of this Court reversing the cause and remanding the same filed in this cause of March 5, 1931, be and the same is now affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.
Buford, C.J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.
Brown, J., dissents in part.
(dissenting in part) :
Upon further consideration of this case, I am inclined to the view that we were in error in our former holding. I concur with Justice Davis that the defect in the verification was not jurisdictional. But I go farther. The Statute is remedial and should be liberally construed. Equity courts had jurisdiction of suits for partition before the statute was enacted. I do not think a defective verification of the bill should be held to be more than.a procedural irregularity which did not affect the power of the Court to proceed with the case. The court could have had this *568•error corrected later, if objections bad been raised, and tbe failure to object amounted to a waiver-of the defect.
Brown, J.
(dissenting in part) :
Upon further consideration of this case, I am inclined to the view that we were in error in our former holding. I concur with Justice Davis that the defect in the verification was not jurisdictional. But I go farther. The Statute is remedial and should be liberally construed. Equity courts had jurisdiction of suits for partition before the statute was enacted. I do not think a defective verification of the bill should be held to be more than.a procedural irregularity which did not affect the power of the Court to proceed with the case. The court could have had this •error corrected later, if objections bad been raised, and tbe failure to object amounted to a waiver-of the defect.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sheffield v. Paul Cook Carter and wife, 141 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…appear to be made by the complainant. However, it has been established that such a complaint could, nevertheless, be sworn to by the attorney. Tibbetts v. Olson, supra. In Beverette v. Graham, 1931, 101 Fla. 563, 132 So. 826, affirmed on rehearing 101 Fla. 566, 135 So. 847, 848, the complaint in a partition suit had been sworn to by the attorney when in fact the statute under which the suit was brought required the complaint to be sworn to by the complainant. The appeal was a direct attack on the decree f…
Authorities Cited
- Seth Johnson and as Individual v. McKinnon, 54 Fla. 221 (Fla. 1907)