ANNIE L. SAULS, APPELLANT,
v.
DAN S. CROSBY AND BERTHA MAE CROSBY, APPELLEES
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Annie Sauls appealed a trial court decision denying her, as a life tenant, the right to cut and sell merchantable timber from property she had conveyed with a life estate reservation. The court affirmed, holding that an ordinary life tenant cannot cut timber for commercial purposes without holding proceeds in trust for the remainderman.
An ordinary life tenant does not have the right to cut merchantable timber for purely commercial reasons. Such conduct constitutes waste. Only a life tenant with explicit language providing for consumption rights or without impeachment for waste may cut and sell timber; an ordinary life tenant may only cut timber for fuel, repairs, fitting the land for cultivation, or other purposes necessary for enjoyment and conformable to good husbandry.
[1] An ordinary life tenant is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the estate, but cannot permanently diminish or change the value of the remainderman's future estate.
[2] An ordinary life tenant generally may not cut timber for purely commercial reasons, as such action constitutes waste for which the remainderman may sue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An ordinary life tenant has no right to cut the timber from an estate for purely commercial reasons and so to do is tortious conduct for which the remainderman may sue immediately.”
Establishes the core holding that commercial timber cutting by ordinary life tenants constitutes actionable waste.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn October 9, 1968, Sauls conveyed lands in Hamilton County, Florida to the Crosbys while reserving a life estate in the property. Sauls sought to cut…
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On the 9th day of October 1968, appellant conveyed to appellees certain lands *327situated in Hamilton County, Florida, with the following reservation set forth in said conveyance: “The Grantor herein, reserves a life Estate in said property.” By this appeal appellant now contends that the trial court erred in denying her, as a life tenant, the right to cut merchantable timber and enjoy the proceeds.
The English common law, which was transplanted on this continent, holds that it is waste for an ordinary life tenant to cut timber upon his estate when the sole purpose is to clear the woodlands.1 American courts today as a general rule recognize that an ordinary life tenant may cut timber and not be liable for waste if he uses the timber for fuel; for repairing fences and buildings on the estate; for fitting the land for cultivation; or for use as pasture if the inheritance is not damaged and the acts are conformable to good husbandry; and for thinning or other purposes which are necessary for the enjoyment of the estate and are in conformity with good husbandry.2
In this jurisdiction a tenant for life or a person vested with an ordinary life estate is entitled to the use and enjoyment of his estate during its existence. The only restriction on the life tenant’s use and enjoyment is that he not permanently diminish or change the value of the future estate of the remainderman.3 This limitation places on the “ordinary life tenant” the responsibility for all waste of whatever character.4
An instrument creating a life tenancy may absolve the tenant of responsibility for waste, unless it is wanton or malicious, by stating that the life tenant has the power to consume or that the life tenant is without impeachment for waste.5 Thus, there is a sharp distinction in the rights of an ordinary life tenant or life tenant without impeachment for waste or life tenant who has the power to consume. An ordinary life tenant has no right to cut the timber from an estate for purely commercial reasons and so to do is tortious conduct for which the remainderman may sue immediately.6
In the case of In re Paine’s Estate,7 the Florida Supreme Court incidentally concerned with the timber rights of a life tenant, by dictum, noted that a life tenant without impeachment for waste could cut and sell the timber on the estate. The rule pronounced in Paine conforms with the general authorities on the subject and is limited to a life tenant with power to consume or a life tenant without impeachment for waste. It does not apply to an ordinary life tenant. In the cause sub judice, the trial court was concerned with the rights of an ordinary life tenant and correctly concluded that appellant “does not have the right to cut merchantable timber from the land involved in this suit unless the proceeds of such cutting and sale are held in trust for the use and benefit of the remaindermen. . . . ”8
The judgment appealed is affirmed.
SPECTOR, C. J., and JOHNSON, J„ concur.
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Chapman v. Chapman, 526 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…a. 2d DCA 1958). Ordinary life tenants may not permanently diminish or alter the value of the remaindermen’s future estate, a limitation which places on ordinary life tenants “the responsibility for all waste of whatever character.” Sauls v. Crosby, 258 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). It is well settled that life tenants are bound in law to pay property taxes during the continuance of their estate. Pike v. Wassell, 94 U.S. 711, 24 L.Ed. 307 (1877). Failure to pay taxes constitutes waste. Therefore, “[a]…1 / 2
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Eve Huson Schneberger v. Schneberger, 979 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…state in the property, responsible for all those obligations of a life tenant. In Florida, “a tenant for life or a person vested with an ordinary life estate is entitled to the use and enjoyment of his estate during its existence.” Sauls v. Crosby, 258 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). “The only restriction on the life tenant’s use and enjoyment is that he not permanently diminish or change the value of the future estate of the remainderman. This limitation places on the ‘ordinary life tenant’ the respons…
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City Nat'l Bank OF Miami v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Hollywood, 356 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…lease. First of all, it is clear that the declaration, following the statutory power given under the then applicable Section 711.06(2), Florida Statutes (1973), made the recreation lease agreement a part of the common elements [See Sauls v. Crosby, 258 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)] by use of frequent statements to that effect, of which the following is but one example: “14. Ownership of Common Elements, (d) Recreational Facilities It is specifically declared that the common elements as described herein i…
Authorities Cited
- Nell Weed v. Knox, 157 Fla. 896 (Fla. 1946)
- Rosella Wagner v. Moseley, 104 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- In the Matter of: The Estate of Maggie G. Paine v. W. J. Garnett de bonis non of the Estate of Maggie G. Paine, 128 Fla. 151 (Fla. 1937)
- Sanders v. State, 157 Fla. 896 (Fla. 1946)
- Sanderson v. Jones, 6 Fla. 430 (Fla. 1855)