SALINAS
v.
UNITED STATES
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The Supreme Court vacated and remanded a Fifth Circuit decision that classified a defendant's prior simple possession conviction as a "controlled substance offense" under federal sentencing guidelines, holding that such a classification was erroneous because the guidelines definition requires intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense—an element not present in simple possession charges.
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Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioner’s prior conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance constituted a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4Bl.l(a) (Nov. 2003). 142 Fed. Appx. 830 (2005). The term “controlled substance offense” is defined in pertinent part, however, as “an offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense” §4B 1.2(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit erred in treating petitioner’s conviction for simple possession as a “controlled substance offense.” The Solicitor General acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly ruled for the United States on this ground. Brief in Opposition 8-9.
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