FLOYD W. MARKLEY, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FLORA W. VAN BILLIARD, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORRIE MAE MADILL, A FREE DEALER, APPELLEE
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The court held that the statute permits deraignment of title only from the issuance of the tax deed, and the failure to join other parties does not preclude judgment against the appellant's interest.
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment quieting title for a tax deed holder. The appellant argued the plaintiff failed to properly deraign…
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This is an appeal from a final judgment quieting the title of the holder of a tax deed. We affirm.
The appellant raises only two substantial questions. The first of these is the alleged failure of the plaintiff to properly deraign her title in the quiet title action. Section 65.081(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., pertaining to quieting tax titles, states as follows:
“When the action is based on a tax deed, the complaint need not deraign title beyond the issuance of the tax deed.”
The appellant claims that the word “beyond” should be construed to require the deraignment of the title prior to the issuance of the tax deed and that the appellee merely deraigned the title since the issuance of the tax deed.
This particular point involved has never been passed upon in Florida. Considering the purpose in requiring a deraignment of title in a quiet title proceeding, it seems obvious to us that the intention of the Legislature here was to require merely the de-raignment of the title after the issuance of the deed and not prior thereto.
The appellant also maintains that the quiet title suit was fatally defective in that various other parties who had or might have claimed an interest in the property prior to issuance of the tax deed were not joined as defendants in the final (second amended) complaint. The appellant was properly made a party to the proceed*724ings and filed her answer therein and through her attorneys participated in the final hearing before the trial judge. It may be that other persons may still have an interest in the property which has not been quieted as against their claim, but this did not preclude the trial court from proceeding to final judgment against the appellant’s interest, if any, in the property.
PIERCE, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
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Sparling v. Boca Raton Land Dev., Inc., 438 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…ck Phosphate Co., supra, and Gibson, supra, have been eliminated by Section 65.041, Florida Statutes. The statute removes the binding nature of an adverse quiet title judgment on a non-party. We find support for this conclusion in Markley v. Madill, 259 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) and in Dunn v. Stack, 394 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In Markley, the Second District rejected the argument that a quiet title action based on a tax deed was defective because of the failure to join various other parties who…