CONSTANCE JONES SCHWARB, APPELLANT,
v.
F. ALLAN SCHWARB, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a divorce judgment limiting alimony to six months, holding that the chancellor abused his discretion by imposing a time limit unsupported by evidence of changed circumstances.
A chancellor abuses his discretion by limiting alimony to a fixed six-month period when the evidence does not support a finding that the wife's need or the husband's ability to pay will terminate at that time.
[1] A chancellor abuses discretion in limiting alimony to a fixed term when the evidence does not establish that the obligee's need or obligor's ability to pay will terminate…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce action, the chancellor awarded the wife $200 monthly alimony for six months (July 15, 1971 to January 15, 1972), but the record contained…
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The plaintiff in an action for divorce has appealed from a final judgment limiting the award of alimony to a six-months period.
The basic question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether the chancellor abused his discretion in so limiting the award of alimony.
In the final judgment, granting the divorce to the plaintiff, the chancellor included the following alimony award to the plaintiff:
“Alimony in the sum of $200.00 commencing July 15, 1971, and continuing thereafter for six consecutive months, terminating on January 15, 1972. . . .”
We have examined the evidence adduced before the chancellor and find insufficient evidence from which the chancellor could reasonably conclude that the need of the plaintiff wife for the alimony payments, or the financial ability of the defendant to make such payments, would, or were likely to, terminate on or about January 15, 1972. In fairness to the chancellor, however, we mention the fact at the end of the judgment he reserved the jurisdiction “to enforce and modify” the above-quoted provision.
We hold, therefore, that the chancellor erred in limiting the award of alimony to a six-months period, so the judgment appealed from herein must be, and it is reversed, and the cause is remanded for *746further proceedings consistent with the views hereinabove expressed.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
WIGGINTON, J., specially concurs.
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion of reversal rendered herein. I would direct, however, that alimony for appellant wife be extended until each of the two minor children whose custody has been awarded to her has reached school age so that appropriate arrangements can then be made for her to engage in some form of gainful employment. By the terms of the decree appealed herein appellant will be forced to almost immediately seek employment in order to survive. Such requirement will inevitably result in her neglect of both the home and her preschool children who are more in need of her constant care and attention now than they will be after they become enrolled in school.
WIGGINTON, Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion of reversal rendered herein. I would direct, however, that alimony for appellant wife be extended until each of the two minor children whose custody has been awarded to her has reached school age so that appropriate arrangements can then be made for her to engage in some form of gainful employment. By the terms of the decree appealed herein appellant will be forced to almost immediately seek employment in order to survive. Such requirement will inevitably result in her neglect of both the home and her preschool children who are more in need of her constant care and attention now than they will be after they become enrolled in school.
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Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…her [*543] position that her needs are not likely to change between 56 and 61 years of age or to cease at 61. A judgment for rehabilitative alimony was considered by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Schwarb v. Schwarb, Fla.App.1972, 259 So. 2d 745. In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that there was no showing on the record that the wife’s needs would end at the expiration of the periodic alimony even though the trial court retained jurisdiction. The court held: “We have e…
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Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…would constitute a change of circumstances for which the husband might seek relief from continued payment of alimony. On authority of the decision of this court in Reback v. Reback, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 541 and Schwarb v. Schwarb, Fla.App.1972, 259 So. 2d 745, we hold that the circumstances relating to the appellant-wife, as disclosed in the record, did not furnish proper basis for the alimony awarded to her to be “rehabilitative”, and to terminate at the end of the stated period. That provision of the j…
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Smith v. Smith, 378 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ctor’s office, sometime prior to her marriage. Therefore, there is nothing to which the wife can be rehabilitated. . On authority of the decision of this, court in Reback v. Reback, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 541 and Schwarb v. Schwarb, Fla.App.1972, 259 So. 2d 745, we hold that the circumstances relating to the appellant-wife, as disclosed in the record, did not furnish proper basis for the alimony awarded to her to be ‘rehabilitative’, and to terminate at the end of the stated period. As we similarly said i…
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