IN RE ESTATE OF GEORGE E. THORNTON. MARIE THORNTON, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM BRETAN, APPELLEE
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Marie Thornton appeals a trial court determination that her deceased husband's 2.64-acre property in unincorporated Dade County was homestead property rather than commercial property. The appellate court affirms, holding that the property qualified as homestead and that rural property is not subject to the acreage limitations imposed on homestead property in incorporated areas.
The property qualified as the homestead of George E. Thornton at the time of his death. Rural property in unincorporated areas is not subject to the acreage limitations that apply to homestead property in incorporated cities or towns, and therefore the entire parcel may be classified as homestead despite mixed residential and commercial use.
[1] Real property can be determined to be homestead property even if a portion of it was used for commercial purposes, particularly when located in an unincorporated area.
[2] Homestead protections for property in unincorporated areas are not subject to the same limitations regarding business use as property within incorporated areas.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Taking the evidence in its entirety, with all conflicts and reasonable inferences therefrom resolved in favor of the trial court's holding, it is apparent that at the time of the death of George E. Thornton the subject property was his homestead.”
Establishes the court's standard of review and affirms the trial court's finding that the property qualified as homestead at the time of Thornton's death.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeorge E. Thornton died intestate (though his will provided his entire estate go to his wife Marie except for a $10 bequest to his daughter Mary Genev…
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Appellant, Marie Thornton, seeks review of a determination of the trial court finding certain real property of George E. Thornton, deceased, to have been homestead property. George E. Thornton died estate. His will provided that his entire estate was to go to his wife, the appellant, with the exception of a $10.00 bequest to his daughter, Mary Geneva Reigner. At the time of his death, George E. Thornton was seized of a 2.64 acre piece of real property located in the unincorporated area of Dade County. The estate was admitted to probate, at which time the appellant stated she was unable to locate Mary Geneva Reigner. At probate, the aforementioned real property was treated as non-homestead property and eventually all of the deceased’s estate went to the appellant, with the exception of the $10.00 which was paid into the registry of the court. Order of final discharge in the probate proceedings was duly entered.
Many years later, the appellant filed a petition to reopen the estate, requesting determination of whether the aforementioned real property was homestead property rather than commercial. A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the interest of Mary Geneva Reigner and he answered stating appellee herein had purchased Mary Geneva Reigner’s interest in said property. The appellee was added as a party and he answered, alleging the property was homestead of the decedent at the time of his death. The cause proceeded to final hearing, resulting in the order appealed herein.
The appellant contends the trial court erred in entering the order appealed, on the grounds that at the time of the death of George E. Thornton the said property was not the homestead of the decedent under the constitution and laws of the State of Florida and, assuming that it was, the trial judge erred in construing the whole parcel as having the statutes of homestead when it was admitted that a portion of the property was used for commercial purposes. We affirm.
Taking the evidence in its entirety, with all conflicts and reasonable inferences therefrom resolved in favor of the trial court’s holding, it is apparent that at the time of the death of George E. Thornton the subject property was his homestead. Miami National Bank v. Fink, Fla.App.1965, 174 So.2d 38; Weiss v. Stone, Fla.App. 1969, 220 So.2d 403; Metropolitan Dade County v. Lucas, Fla.App. 1969, 228 So.2d 292. Further, the property being in the unincorporated area, the limitations on the extent of homestead relating to property within an incorporated area1 are not applicable to property in a rural area. Armour & Company v. Hulvey, 73 Fla. 294, *76274 So. 212; Fort v. Rigdon, 100 Fla. 398, 129 So. 847; Yowell v. Rogers, 128 Fla. 881, 175 So. 772.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the order under review be and it is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Miami Nat'l Bank v. Fink, 174 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Armour & Co. v. Hulvey, 73 Fla. 294 (Fla. 1917)
- Weiss v. Stone, 220 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Yowell v. Rogers, 128 Fla. 881 (Fla. 1937)
- Fort v. Cora Rigdon, 100 Fla. 398 (Fla. 1930)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Lucas, 228 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)