ARTHUR JORDAN
v.
STATE

Fla. | 1939-11-21
Buford and Thomas, J. J., concur., Chapman, J., concurs in opinion and judgment., Justices Whitfield and Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
140 Fla. 735 Florida Supreme Court (1939) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 192 So. 200
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a first-degree murder conviction and death sentence, holding that the judgment was not fatally defective despite containing archaic language and omitting a specific mention of mercy recommendations.


Holding

No, the judgment is not fatally defective. The phrase 'suffer the pains' of death is surplusage and not harmful, the absence of a mercy recommendation is not an error if the jury took no affirmative action, and the judgment clearly states conviction for first-degree murder.


Key Quotes

“Suffer the pains" of death is an old common-law remnant that still lingers but, in this case, it was in no sense harmful and was mere surplusage as the death penalty was imposed by electrocution.”

Establishes that the archaic language in the judgment was not a fatal flaw.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, and convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to be electrocuted. He sought relief from the judgment…

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Opinion of the Court
Terrell, C. J. —

Terrell, C. J. —

Plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree. He was sentenced to be electrocuted and seeks relief from that judgment by writ of error.

No error is alleged to have been committed at the trial but it is contended that the judgment was fatally defective in that (1) it was not definite as to the crime for which defendant was convicted; (2) it did not state whether the defendant was recommended for mercy by the jury, and (3) it was vitiated because it contained the phrase “suffer the pains” of death.

“Suffer the pains” of death is an old common-law remnant that still lingers but, in this case, it was in no sense harmful and was mere surplusage as the death penalty was imposed by electrocution.

The verdict was in substantial compliance with the law. *737The matter of recommending mercy is a function of the jury under proper charge and if they take no affirmative action in this, the trial court will not be held in error for not so announcing in his judgment. The judgment states in terms that defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the first degree and that he was convicted and adjudged to be guilty of murder in the first degree.

The judgment is therefore not amenable to the assault made on it so it is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Buford and Thomas, J. J., concur.

Chapman, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.

Justices Whitfield and Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Alachua Cnty. v. Powers, 351 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1977)
    …board refers to White v. Crandon, 116 Fla. 162, 156 So. 303 (1934), where this Court held that county commissioners could be personally liable for funds expended without authority of law. The board also points to Davis, et al. v. Keen, 140 Fla. 764, 192 So. 200 (1939), where the Court said that the board has the power and authority to reject payment of an unlawful account, holding that the statutes imposed a discretionary power or authority on the Board to determine whether or not a claim when presented is…
  • …nse, as politicians. Any supposed errors in the substance of their views or the manner in which their opinions are expressed are therefore ordinarily subject only to relief at the polls, not in the courts. See generally, Davis v. Keen, 140 Fla. 764, 192 So. 200 (1939); Osban v. Cooper, 63 Fla. 542, 58 So. 50 (1912); Broward County Rubbish Assn. v. Broward County, 112 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959); Senior Citizens Protective League, Inc. v. McNayr, 132 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); 2 McQuillin, Municipal C…
  • …othing to do with discretionary matters and will not on review substitute their judgment for that of the respective boards. Broward County Rubbish Contractor’s Assn. v. Broward County, Fla.App.1959, 112 So. 2d 898; Davis v. Keen, 1939, 140 Fla. 764, 192 So. 200. See also Webb v. Hill, Fla.1954, 75 So. 2d 596. The necessity for the bridge has been determined. While its erection will undoubtedly drastically curtail the public right of navigation upon the canal, nevertheless, that right is not superior to th…

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