LUCILLE FLEET FORD, AS LEGAL GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF MADGE K. DENNIS, A/K/A MARGARET KENNEDY SHIELDS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN JOSEPH SHIELDS, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a trial court's denial of continued alimony payments after the husband's death. Although Florida law generally prohibits charging alimony against a deceased husband's estate without prior agreement, the court held that the husband's failure to appeal the divorce decree and his years of voluntary payment constituted implied consent, making the alimony obligation binding on his estate.
The court held that although a trial judge cannot award alimony as a charge against a deceased husband's estate without his stipulation or agreement, a husband's failure to appeal the decree and his many years of voluntary payment constitute implied consent to the alimony provisions, making the decree final and not subject to collateral attack and binding on the estate.
[1] Alimony payments awarded in a divorce decree may continue after the death of the obligor spouse if the decree provides for alimony for the recipient spouse's lifetime and…
[2] A trial court lacks authority to award alimony as a charge against a deceased ex-husband's estate unless the husband has stipulated or agreed that his estate may be so bo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the husband's estate remains liable for the obligation in the same manner as it is liable for any other legitimate obligation outstanding at the time of his death.”
Establishes that alimony obligations extend to the estate when the decree provides for payment during the wife's lifetime.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMadge Dennis was awarded $200 per month alimony in her 1966 divorce from John Shields, payable "for the rest of her life or until she remarries." John…
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This case presents the question of the continuation of alimony after the death of the husband. Appellant Madge Dennis was awarded $200 per month alimony, “. . . for the rest of her life or until she remarries . . .,” upon her divorce from John Shields in 1966. John Shields paid the sums ordered until his death on February 9, 1970, at which time payments ceased. It is stipulated that the deceased had never contested the alimony allowance and, further, that there was no express contract in writing between the parties providing for the payment of alimony beyond the death of the husband.
Madge’s guardian brought this action against John’s estate seeking to “enforce” the foregoing provision of the final decree *877of divorce by requiring continued installments of alimony to be paid out of the estate. The trial judge denied the petition for continuation of alimony on the ground that “. . . the final decree of divorce did not provide that the alimony in the amount of $200 per month payable by the defendant to the plaintiff should be a charge upon his estate in the case of his demise. . . .” We reverse.
Preliminarily, we have no trouble in construing the alimony award in the divorce decree as providing for alimony payments after the death of the husband if the wife outlived him. The decree provided for alimony “for the rest of her life” and the only condition imposed was that she not remarry. In Johnson v. Every,1 the term “until the death of the wife” used in connection with alimony meant that:
“. . . the husband’s estate remains liable for the obligation in the same manner as it is liable for any other legitimate obligation outstanding at the time of his death.”
But our inquiry cannot stop there. The more fundamental question is whether such an award is permissible in the absence of an agreement or stipulation. Appellee correctly points out that the pronouncements of our Supreme Court in Aldrich v. Aldrich,2 clearly mandate that a trial judge is without authority to award alimony as a charge against the deceased ex-husband’s estate during the lifetime of the wife “unless the husband has stipulated or agreed that his estate may be so bound.”3 Here, as in Aldrich, there was no prior express agreement between the parties that the estate would be bound.
Were this the sole teaching of Aldrich we would be required to affirm. However, Aldrich holds further that when the husband did not appeal from the decree, and had paid the amounts specified therein without question for many years, he had in effect consented to all its provisions respecting alimony. The decree thus became final and is “not now subject to collateral attack.”4 The stipulated facts in this case bring it within this latter discipline of Aid-rich and we must, therefore, reverse.
Reversed.
HOBSON, A. C. J., concurs.
MANN, J., dissents.
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Bunn, 311 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…appellee, First National Bank in St. Petersburg v. Ford, supra, is authoritative only for two matters, namely, (1) that the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in the case of Ford v. First National Bank in St. Petersburg, Fla.App. 1972, 260 So. 2d 876, did not conflict, but rather was clearly in accord with Aldrich v. Aldrich, supra, and (2) there being no conflict between such decisions, the Supreme Court of Florida lacked jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, to c…
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The First Nat'l Bank IN ST. Petersburg v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973)…ROBERTS, Justice. This cause is before this Court on petition for writ of certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 260 So. 2d 876, which purportedly conflicts with Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1964). Madge Dennis, also known as Margaret Kennedy Shields, filed suit for and was granted a divorce from her husband, John Joseph Shields, now deceased, in the Circuit Cour…
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Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…hancellor is without authority to award alimony as a charge against the estate of a deceased husband during the lifetime of the wife unless the husband has so stipulated or agreed thereto. Ford v. First National Bank in St. Petersburg, Fla.App.1972, 260 So. 2d 876; Wilbur v. Wilbur, Fla.App. 1974, 299 So. 2d 99. Appellant has not entered into such stipulatioh or agreement and we conclude that the chancellor acted in excess of his jurisdiction with respect thereto. Additionally, we are' in accord with appella…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1964)
- Beulah v. Johnson, 93 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1957)