STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RODNEY FOUST, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1972-05-30
No. 72-293
Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
262 So. 2d 686 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1972) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appealed a trial court's order suppressing evidence seized from Rodney Foust upon his arrest pursuant to bench warrants. The appellate court reversed, holding that the arrest was valid under the bench warrants and that the search incident to arrest was reasonable, regardless of whether the initial stop lacked probable cause.


Holding

The court held that the arrest was valid under the bench warrants and the search incident to that arrest was reasonable. The court further held that the reasonableness of the search after arrest was not affected by whether the original stopping lacked probable cause.


Headnotes

[1] A search incident to a lawful arrest is permissible for evidence of any crime, not solely the crime for which the arrest was made.

[2] A search incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond a search for weapons or instrumentalities of escape.

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Key Quotes

“We reject these reversionary views as contrary to the entire body of established law which has been built up in this area and which permits proper incidental search that reasonably ensues after a legal arrest”

Establishes the court's holding that searches incident to lawful arrest are proper under Florida law

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Facts & Procedural History

Foust was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana on February 11, 1972. He was arrested pursuant to two bench warrants that were revealed to the…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Judge.

PEARSON, Judge.

The State of Florida instituted this interlocutory appeal after the trial court entered an order granting the appellee’s motion to suppress evidence.1 The evidence in question was seized when the appellee was arrested pursuant to the authority of two bench warrants.

On February 11, 1972, the defendant was charged by information with the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana. On March 2, 1972, the defendant filed his motion to suppress evidence. The motion was supported by the grounds that “said evidence was illegally seized without a warrant and the defendant was aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.” The arresting officer was called as a witness when the motion was heard before the trial court on March 7, 1972. No other witnesses testified.

The Supreme Court of Florida has set forth its most recent holdings on the scope of a search incident to an arrest in State v. Gustafson, Fla.1972, 258 So.2d 1. In discussing a search which occurred after a person had been arrested for failing to have a driver’s license in his possession, the Court held:

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“The district court opinion poses the query: ‘May the search be for evidence of any crime, or is it limited to fruits of the crime for which the person was arrested?’ (emphasis ours) The district’s answer would restrict the search to that relating to the particular crime for which the actual arrest was made. It would even limit the search after arrest ‘to a search for weapons, which normally entails only ‘ “patting down” ’ the suspect.’ Further on, the opinion would limit custodial search ‘to weapons and instrumentalities for escape.’ This is contrary not only to all Florida authorities as cited above but actually would be in derogation of the statute, section 901.-21.
“[3] We reject these reversionary views as contrary to the entire body of established law which has been built up in this area and which permits proper incidental search that reasonably ensues after a legal arrest, in accordance with the foregoing authorities which we have set forth and in accordance with our Fla.Stat. § 902.21, F.S.A. This is no time for a retreat in the law when modern methods are demanded by accelerating criminal activity.” [Emphasis as indicated.]
*688 % % ‡ * * *

See also State v. Holmes, Fla.App.1971, 256 So.2d 32.

We hold that the arrest of the appellant was valid under the bench warrants which were revealed to the officer by radio check. See Murphy v. State, Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 261; Fla.Stat. §§ 901.15(4), 901.16, F.S.A. Further, the search of appellee’s person incident to such arrest was reasonable. It is also our view that the reasonableness of the search after arrest was not affected by the fact that the original stopping of appellee may have been without probable cause. Accordingly, the order suppressing evidence seized at the time of appellee’s arrest is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2006)
    …WELLS, J. We have for review the decision in Frierson v. State, 851 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in State v. Foust, 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. CONFLICT ISSUES In Foust, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s decision to suppress certain evidence that was found after an arrest, holding in rel…
    1 / 3
  • Willingham v. The City OF Orlando, 929 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …ant was validly issued, and it was the duty of the agencies to see to it that the warrant was given full effect. See State v. Walkin, 802 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Wigfall v. State, 323 So. 2d 587, 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); State v. Foust, 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Thus, we conclude that under these circumstances, there was no special duty owed to Mr. Willingham by either the City or the County, and that they were not liable for his arrest or detention. Mr. Willingham argues that our earli…
  • Frierson v. State, 851 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
    …that the trial judge should have granted the motion to suppress the firearm because the initial traffic stop was not supported by reasonable cause. The trial court relied upon Wigfall v. State, 323 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) and State v. Foust, 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). In Foust, the police arrested the defendant pursuant to two bench warrants which were revealed to the officer by a radio check. 262 So. 2d at 687. A search of the defendant incident to the arrest uncovered marijuana. Id. The tri…

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