RALPH WESTER
v.
STATE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ralph Wester appealed his conviction for murder, challenging the trial court's instruction defining principals in the first and second degree. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the instruction was correct and that principals of both degrees are equally guilty and punishable alike.
The instruction defining principals in the first and second degree was correct. Both principals in the first and second degree are equally guilty and punishable alike, regardless of which one actually committed the felonious act, provided one committed the act and the other was present (actually or constructively) and aided and abetted. The court did not err in failing to define 'constructively' where jurors would understand the term and there was no request for a more detailed instruction.
“A principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree are both principals, and are punishable alike. The degrees are designed merely to indicate that one actually committed the felonious act, and that the other was present (actually or constructively) aiding and abetting the felonious act. Both are equally guilty”
Establishes the core legal principle that accomplices of different degrees are equally liable for the crime
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRalph Wester was convicted of murder. He was parked near the victim's home and the scene of the murder, close enough to hear the report of the gun. Th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Principal In The Second Degree cases and more on FLexlaw
This is a companion to the case of Woodrow Wester v. State, decided this day (193 So. 300), and what we said in that opinion disposes of all questions raised here except one criticizing a charge of the court defining principals in the first and second degree. (That part of the opinion in the other case which dealt with threats said to have been made by Woodrow Wester against the deceased is, of course, irrelevant to this one.)
The questioned instruction was:
“A principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree are both principals, and are punishable alike. The degrees are designed merely to indicate that one actually committed the felonious act, and that the other was present (actually or constructively) aiding and abetting the felonious act. Both are equally guilty; and it is not material which one is alleged to have actually committed the felonious act, (if) it is duly proven that one committed the act and that the other was present, and aided and abetted the alleged felony.”
That the charge is correct is evident from reading the following cases: Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 South. *376Rep. 865; Bryan v. State, 19 Fla. 864, and Neumann v. State, 116 Fa. 98, 156 South. Rep. 237.
No error could have resulted from failure to define “constructively,” as is urged. It is not incumbent upon the court to define words, used in the charges, which are understandable to persons possessed of the qualifications required of jurors; there was no request for the definitive instruction; and the evidence shows that this plaintiff in error was parked so near the victim’s home and the scene of the murder that the report of the gun was heard by him.
The judgment is—
Affirmed.
Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Buford and Chapman, J. J., concur.
Justice Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jimenez v. State, 158 Fla. 719 (Fla. 1947)…he fact, by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished in the same manner prescribed for the punishment of the principal felony.” See Albritton v. State, 32 Fla. 358, 13 So. 955; Wester v. [*729] State, 141 Fla. 374, 193 So. 303, Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, 156 So. 237 and Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865; Ferguson v. State and Maxwell v. State, 168 Fla. 345, 28 So. (2nd) 427; Warren on Homicide, Vol. 2, page 135, State v. Payne, 10 Washington 545, 39…
-
Scheel v. State, 350 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…defense is for determination by the jury, and the trial court was not required to give a specific instruction on ‘implied consent’. Danford v. State, 53 Fla. 4, 43 So. 593 (1907); Lindberg v. State, 134 Fla. 786, 184 So. 662 (1938); Wester v. State, 141 Fla. 374, 193 So. 303 (1940); State v. Bryan, 287 So. 2d 73 (Fla.1973).” We need not further discuss the first point. The second point, which raises the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, has been considered and found not to present error…
-
Ralston v. State, 350 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…defense is for determination by the jury, and the trial court was not required to give a specific instruction on “implied consent”. Danford v. State, 53 Fla. 4, 43 So. 593 (1907); Lindberg v. State, 134 Fla. 786, 184 So. 662 (1938); Wester v. State, 141 Fla. 374, 193 So. 303 (1940); State v. Bryan, 287 So. 2d 73 (Fla.1973). As to the last point, the prosecutrix’ testimony alone (which was obviously believed by the jury) was sufficient to make out a prima facie case and, therefore, no error was made by the…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428 (Fla. 1922)
- Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98 (Fla. 1934)
- Bryan v. State, 19 Fla. 864 (Fla. 1883)
- Wester v. State, 141 Fla. 369 (Fla. 1940)