GLORIA AZAR, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES THEODORE AZAR, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1972-05-30
No. 71-896
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ-, BARKDULL, C. J., concurs in judgment.
263 So. 2d 266 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1972)

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Synopsis

Gloria Azar appeals a divorce judgment in which the trial court struck her pleadings for discovery violations but permitted her to participate in the final hearing on property matters. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding no reversible error in the court's striking of pleadings or its property division rulings.


Holding

The trial court did not commit reversible error in striking the pleadings and entering a default under Rule 1.380(b) FRCP, as the plaintiff was permitted to be heard and litigate her property claims at trial. The evidence was sufficient to support the judgment on all property matters.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has the power to strike a party's pleadings and enter a default judgment for disobedience of a discovery order.

[2] A default judgment may be affirmed even if the defaulting party was permitted to participate in the final hearing on property claims.

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Key Quotes

“The trial court was empowered to so order, in the circumstances, under Rule 1.380(b) FRCP, 30 F.S.A.”

Establishes that the trial court had authority to strike pleadings for discovery violations under the applicable rule

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Facts & Procedural History

Gloria Azar and Charles Theodore Azar were parties to a divorce action involving substantial property rights issues concerning businesses and other as…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is by the plaintiff from a divorce judgment. The pleadings raised substantial issues relating to property rights of the parties in certain businesses and other assets. The trial court struck the pleadings of the plaintiff wife and entered a default against her, for her disobedience of an order relating to discovery. However, notwithstanding the default, the court permitted the wife to participate on final hearing with relation to the properties. The judgment granted the defendant husband a divorce on his counterclaim, and ruled on the property rights of the parties. Thereby the wife was allowed to retain the property which was solely owned by her. The residence of the parties was ordered to be listed by them for sale, with the proceeds of the sale to be divided between them. The wife was given the furnishings thereof. The husband was declared to be the owner of the corporations Sevilla International, Inc. and G.M.C.A. Corporation, except that as to a certain note of the latter corporation, secured by a chattel mortgage, which had been made to and was possessed by the wife, it was held the husband should have an equal interest with her therein. A diamond ring deposited by the parties with a jeweler for sale was declared to be the property of the husband. Another diamond ring, of 7.8 carats was declared to be the property of the husband “and or his mother.” The wife was declared to be the owner of "any interest in M.B.G. Investments Corp.” and any saving accounts in her name. The parties’ joint savings and checking accounts were held to be joint.

*267The first contention presented by the appellant is that the court committed error in striking her pleadings and entering the default. The trial court was empowered to so order, in the circumstances, under Rule 1.380(b) FRCP, 30 F.S.A.

Entry of the default and denial of plaintiffs’ motion to set it aside was not error, by virtue of the provisions of the rule cited above, and for the further reason that the plaintiff, at trial, was permitted to be heard and to litigate her property claims, and to oppose those of the defendants.

The further contention of the appellant that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment is found to be without merit upon consideration thereof on the basis of the record and briefs.

No reversible error having been made to appear, the judgment is affirmed.

BARKDULL, C. J., concurs in judgment.


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