EDWARD LEE BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Edward Lee Brown appeals his conviction for possession and sale of heroin, challenging the legality of his sentences. The Florida appellate court holds that where two convictions arise from a single transaction, only one sentence may be imposed—for the highest offense—and a trial court cannot increase punishment by vacating a valid sentence and imposing a new one.
The court holds that separate sentences on convictions for offenses arising from a single transaction are improper; only one sentence for the highest offense is applicable. Furthermore, a trial court lacks power to vacate a criminal judgment that has been partly satisfied by a defendant and impose a new or different judgment increasing punishment, even at the same term of court. The trial court erred in vacating the valid five-year sentence on the sale count.
[1] Separate sentences may not be imposed for two offenses that constitute facets of a single transaction; the sentence should be for the highest offense charged.
[2] A trial court generally lacks the power to set aside a criminal judgment after it has been partly satisfied and impose a new judgment that increases the punishment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Florida, it is established law that where convictions are entered upon two offenses, each of which constitutes a facet of a single transaction, it is improper to impose separate sentences on each. Only one sentence is applicable and that sentence should be for the highest offense charged.”
Establishes the core legal principle that multiple convictions from a single transaction warrant only one sentence for the highest offense.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn October 19, 1970, Brown was charged with possession and sale of heroin in two separate counts. He was convicted by jury on both counts and initiall…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Possession Of Narcotics cases and more on FLexlaw
This is an appeal from a final judgment, entered pursuant to jury verdict, finding appellant guilty of possession and sale of a narcotic drug (heroin) and the sentences imposed therefor.
The information against appellant charged him with two counts — possession and sale of a narcotic drug — both offenses occurring on October 19, 1970. Having been found guilty of both offenses by the jury, appellant was sentenced on March 16, 1971, to five years on each count, said sentences to run consecutively. On March 17, 1971, the sentence imposed on the second *29count, sale, was set aside and revoked and appellant was resentenced to a term of ten years on said count, to run consecutive to the prior sentence of five years imposed for possession. Upon appellant’s motion to vacate and set aside sentence, on June 16, 1971, the sentence imposed on March 16th as to the first count and the sentence imposed on March 17th as to the second count were set aside and revoked. Appellant was then sentenced to serve ten years on the second count, sale, and was released on his own recognizance upon the first count, possession, the court reserving jurisdiction of the cause to impose sentence at a later date as the court may deem advisable.
Appellant now contends that the sentence imposed was illegal. We agree.
In Florida, it is established law that where convictions are entered upon two offenses, each of which constitutes a facet of a single transaction, it is improper to impose separate sentences on each. Only one sentence is applicable and that sentence should be for the highest offense charged. Williams v. State, 69 So.2d 766 (Fla.1953); Yost v. State, 243 So.2d 469 (Fla.App. 3rd, 1971); Martin v. State, 251 So.2d 283 (Fla.App. 1st, 1971).
The appellee-State concedes the applicability of the above principle to the facts of this case, with respect to the separate sentence for possession. However, it contends that since the entire March 16th sentence was invalid, the court could properly impose a new sentence on the sale count, and said new sentence may be greater or may differ materially in effect from the previous sentence. State ex rel. Rhoden v. Chapman, 127 Fla. 9, 172 So. 56 (1937). It is further alleged that since the 10 year sentence on the second count conformed to the requirements of law and did not exceed the original sentence in terms of total years, it was valid.
The appellee’s reasoning would be correct if the entire March 16th sentence were invalid. Such, however, is not the situation herein. Only the separate sentence for possession was illegal. The five year sentence for sale was not invalid by itself. Where two separate judgments or sentences are imposed together, the legality of each must be determined separately. See the cases of Williams v. State, supra; Wells v. State, 168 So.2d 787 (Fla.App. 3rd, 1964); and Martin v. State, supra.
It is further established that a trial court is generally without power to- set aside a criminal judgment after it has been partly satisfied by a defendant, and impose a new or different judgment increasing the punishment, even at the same term of court at which the original judgment was imposed. Smith v. Brown, 135 Fla. 830, 185 So. 732 (1938). There are, of course, various exceptions to this rule, but we do not feel that the present case falls within them.
Accordingly, it was error for the trial judge to vacate that portion of the March 16th sentence pertaining to the second count of sale, the highest offense charged; and this case is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a sentence not to exceed the original sentence imposed on March 16, 1971, for the offense of sale of a narcotic drug, to wit: five years. All other orders concerning the imposition of sentences are reversed.
We have examined the other assignments of error concerning the actual trial of this cause and find them wholly without merit.
Reversed and remanded for proper sentencing in accordance with this decision.
SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1984)…count two, on remand the court would have been free to change the sentence from concurrent to consecutive so long as it stayed within the confines of North Carolina v. Pearce. See Herring v. State, 411 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). But we hold that where a conviction is not challenged and not disturbed by the appellate court, and has been fully satisfied by.its terms by the time the trial court receives the case on remand, a sentence originally ordered to…
-
Herring v. State, 411 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…an enhanced sentence for we see little if any difference in the result,” felt bound by existing case law to reverse. Our review of the cases relied on in Pahud points us in an opposite direction. A. The court’s reliance in Pahud on Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), and United States v. Sacco, 367 F. 2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966), is misplaced. Those cases held that a trial court is not free to change a valid and unchallenged sentence. In Brown v. State, supra, the defendant was sentenced on March…
-
Pahud v. State, 370 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…of the legal portion of the sentence has commenced. Ex parte Lange, supra; United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1930); United States v. Best, 571 F. 2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978); Duggins, supra; Kennedy, supra; Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). Since the concurrent term of the sentences first imposed was a valid portion of those sentences, the change thereof to consecutive terms is held to have increased petitioners punishment. Kennedy, supra; Duggins, supra; United St…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Williams v. State, 69 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1953)
- Smith v. Brown, 135 Fla. 830 (Fla. 1939)
- State v. Chapman, 127 Fla. 9 (Fla. 1937)
- Martin v. State, 251 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Wells v. State, 168 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)