FREDA K. LIPSIUS AND HOWARD S. LIPSIUS, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
BRISTOL-MYERS COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Freda Lipsius appealed a jury verdict in a products liability case against Bristol-Myers Company, challenging the trial court's exclusion of expert witness compensation questions, taxation of expert fees as costs, and refusal to instruct the jury on strict liability. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge and rejecting the strict liability doctrine under Florida law.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow cross-examination about expert witness compensation or in taxing expert fees as costs. Florida law does not recognize a strict liability doctrine in products liability cases; instead, products liability actions must be based on traditional negligence or warranty principles.
[1] A trial court has discretion to preclude cross-examination of an expert witness regarding the amount of compensation received or expected for testimony, and this discreti…
[2] The amount of compensation paid to an expert witness is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court to regulate during cross-examination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court, in its discretion, can preclude cross-examination of an expert witness as to the amount he has received or expects to receive for testifying, and this discretion shall not be disturbed on appeal unless clear abuse is shown.”
Establishes the standard for appellate review of trial court decisions limiting expert witness compensation questions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFreda K. Lipsius brought a products liability action against Bristol-Myers Company. At trial, the defendant's expert witnesses testified. The plaintif…
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Appellant, Freda K. Lipsius, appeals a jury verdict and judgment entered thereon in an action sounding in products liability rendered in favor of appellee, Bristol-Myers Company. Salient points posed by appellant are: That the trial court erred (1) in refusing to allow plaintiff to cross-examine defendant’s expert witnesses as to the amount they were to receive as compensation for their testimony, (2) in taxing the expert witness fees as costs, and (3) in refusing to charge the jury on strict liability.
The well established rule is that the trial court, in its discretion, can preclude *397cross-examination of an expert witness as to the amount he has received or expects to receive for testifying, and this discretion shall not be disturbed on appeal unless clear abuse is shown. The Supreme Court of Florida in considering this question in Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1941), stated:
“The cross-examiner elicited the fact that the witness was receiving a ‘certain retainer’ from the plaintiff for testifying. The line of questioning continued along this course until the court refused to permit the question as to the amount of compensation the witness was receiving. The defendant now insists the court’s ruling thereon was error.
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“Because in the nature of the case, no definite rule can be laid down as to what circumstances may be inquired about to show a witness’ bias, the matter rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of the discretion. [Citing numero’us cases.]”
Our sister court in considering the same question in H. I. Holding Company v. Dade County, 129 So.2d 693 (3 Fla.App.1961), stated:
“ . . . The trial judge is vested with considerable discretion in regulating and controlling the manner of examination of witnesses, and his exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it has been abused or substantial harm has been done to the complaining party. 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 555.”
It is our conclusion that appellant has failed to show a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in not allowing cross-examination as to the amount appellee agreed to pay its expert witnesses. The same conclusion is reached with reference to the amount of expert witness fees taxed against appellant. As to the final salient point concerning the doctrine of strict liability, this jurisdiction has rejected such doctrine in McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, 174 So.2d 736 (Fla.1965). We have carefully reviewed the record and the other points posed by appellant and conclude that this case was fairly tried and the judgment rendered should be and is hereby
Affirmed.
SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ„ concur.
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Lipsius v. Bristol-Myers Co., 269 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1972)…McCAIN, Justice. The instant case comes to us on petition for certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, entered on July 25, 1972, and reported at 265 So. 2d 396. No petition for rehearing directed to that opinion was filed by petitioners. However, petitioners did move to have the opinion certified to this Court as passing upon a question of great public interest. That motion was never acted on by the Distri…
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Levert Linder and Emma Jean Linder v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 315 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…acceptance in Florida is primarily founded upon the dictum recited in the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Department Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (4 Fla.App.1974). This Court in Lipsius v. Bristol-Myers Company, 265 So. 2d 396 (1 Fla.App.1972) expressly rejected the doctrine of strict liability, and we are not now persuaded to do otherwise. The judgment appealed is affirmed. JOHNSON and McCORD, JJ., concur.…
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Langston v. King, 410 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…t the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (Fla.1940). Also see H. I. Holding Co. v. Dade County, 129 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 133 So. 2d 646 (Fla.1961); Lipsius v. Bristol-Myers Co., 265 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). We, of course, are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling, and have done so here. However, while we agree that the trial court has broad discretion in determining the extent to which a witness may be examined about any inter…
Authorities Cited
- Pandula v. Pinkey Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395 (Fla. 1940)
- Grall v. Risden, 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965)
- H. I. Holding Co. v. Dade Cnty., 129 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)