MARK THOMAS RILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Riley was charged with marijuana possession after a police officer recovered a vial of marijuana that Riley abandoned into a waterway. Riley sought suppression of the evidence, arguing the officer's initial stop was unlawful, but the court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that the evidence was validly obtained through voluntary abandonment rather than through a search.
The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that although the initial stop may have lacked a valid statutory basis, the evidence was not tainted because it was not produced through a search but rather through Riley's voluntary abandonment of possession.
[1] Evidence voluntarily abandoned by a suspect is not subject to suppression, even if the initial encounter with law enforcement was not justified.
[2] An officer's inquiry about the contents of a suspect's pocket does not constitute a search.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the tangible evidence had not been produced as a result of a search, but rather had been voluntarily abandoned by appellant”
The trial court's basis for denying suppression, adopted by the appellate court, establishing that voluntary abandonment rather than illegal search was the source of the evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt 1:45 a.m., a Fort Lauderdale police officer observed Riley walking in a fashionable hotel and residential area. The officer stopped his patrol car,…
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Appellant, charged with possession of marijuana, sought to have the tangible evidence suppressed. When the motion was denied, appellant voluntarily changed his plea to nolo contendere expressly reserving his right to seek appellate .review of. the order denying the motion to suppress. The propriety of that order is the sole issue here.
The pertinent facts revealed at the hearing on motion to suppress are summarized as follows: At 1:45 a. m. a police officer of the City of Fort Lauderdale, while on patrol, observed appellant walking on the street in a fashionable hotel and residential area. The officer stopped his patrol car a short distance from appellant, got out of the car and awaited appellant’s approach. The officer then asked appellant his name to which appellant gave the unresponsive answer that he “had no identification on him”. The officer, noticing a bulge in the watchpocket of appellant’s trousers, asked what was in the pocket. Appellant removed a small vial from the watchpocket saying, “Oh, this? Oh, this is nothing”, and proceeded to toss the vial into a nearby waterway. Appellant was then placed in the officer’s patrol car while the vial was retrieved from the water. It was found to contain a small quantity of marijuana, the evidence sought to be suppressed.
Paraphrased, it is appellant’s contention that since the officer had no valid basis to stop appellant and interrogate him, the subsequently produced tangible evidence thereby became tainted and inadmissible. This argument would be persuasive had the tangible evidence been produced through means of a search. Cf. Kraemer v. State, Fla. 1952, 60 So.2d 615.
*174Although the state devotes a substantial portion of its brief to the argument that the officer was authorized to stop and interrogate appellant by virtue of Section 901.151, F.S.1969, F.S.A., we are satisfied that the facts here are totally insufficient to justify applicability of that statute. The trial court based its decision squarely upon a determination that the tangible evidence had not been produced as a result of a search, but rather had been voluntarily abandoned by appellant. We agree. The officer’s inquiry of appellant (concerning the content of the latter’s watchpocket) did not amount to a search, and appellant’s conduct in producing the vial and throwing it into the adjacent waterway was clearly an abandonment of possession. We affirm on the authority of Mitchell v. State, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 726; State v. Padilla, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 309; State v. Jackson, Fla.App.1970, 240 So.2d 88.
Affirmed.
REED, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
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Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…wise voluntary abandonment of property cannot be tainted or made involuntary by a prior illegal police [*1336] stop of such person. Freyre v. State, 362 So. 2d 989 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Smith v. State, 333 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla.4th DCA 1972). Contra: Stanley v. State, 327 So. 2d 243 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). Only when the police begin to conduct an illegal search can a subsequent abandonment of property be held involuntary as being tainted by the prior illegal search, Kraeme…
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Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2010)…y in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.” 14A Fla. Jur. 2D Abandoned Property § 633 (2001); see Maxwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla.1983); Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). “No search occurs when police retrieve property voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable expectation of privacy.” State v. Milligan, 411 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). State v. Lamp…
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Maxwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1983)…eizures. See United States v. Jackson, 544 F. 2d 407 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Colbert, 474 F. 2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc); State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.1980); Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Next appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the electronic media from the courtroom without holding an evidentiary hearing. We enunciated the test for excluding electronic media coverage of…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kraemer v. State, 60 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1952)
- State v. Padilla, 235 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Mitchell v. State, 60 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1952)
- State v. Jackson, 240 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)