STATE EX REL. B. B. TENNANT
v.
J. M. BURNETT, AS TAX COLLECTOR OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a mandamus petition challenging a tax collector's denial of a restaurant operating license. The court held that while the relator was required to pay both an inspection fee to the Hotel Commission and an excise tax to the tax collector, the judgment below was partially reversed to clarify the applicable tax requirements.
The court held that restaurant operators are lawfully required to pay both the inspection fee to the Hotel Commission under Section 11 of Chapter 16042, Acts of 1933 (as amended), and an additional excise tax under Section 6 of Chapter 18011, Acts of 1937, before obtaining a restaurant operating license.
“the law requires a person conducting a restaurant, like the one described in the petition and alternative writ, to pay an inspection fee to the Hotel Commission of the State of Florida under the provisions of Section 11 of Chapter 16042, Acts of 1933, as amended by Section 3 of Chapter 17062, Acts of 1933.”
Establishes the first statutory requirement for restaurant operators to pay an inspection fee
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceB. B. Tennant applied for a 1939-1940 license to operate a restaurant in Tampa, Florida serving 30-49 persons per meal. Tennant tendered $2.75 to the …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
On October 2, 1939, an alternative writ of mandamus, on the relation of B. B. Tennant, issued out of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, commanding Hpn. J. M. Burnett, as Tax Collector of Hills-borough County, Florida, the respondent, to issue a 1939-1940 license to operate a restaurant in Tampa, Florida, where some 30 to 49 persons were served at each meal. The relator, as shown by the alternative writ, had made written application to the respondent for a license to operate a restaurant and tendered to him the sum of $2.75 under the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 18011, Acts of 1937; the sum of 25 cents required by Section 1 as a fee for the county judge, and $2.50 pursuant to Section 2 of Chapter 18011, supra. The alternative writ recited that the relator had paid to the Hotel Commission of Florida the sum of $5.00 as required by Section 11 of Chapter 16042, *880Acts of 1933, as amended by Section 3 of Chapter 17062, Acts of 1935.
A motion to quash the alternative writ was made by the respondent on the ground largely that the relator was liable for an inspection tax under Section 11 of Chapter 16042, Acts of 1933, as amended by Section 3 of Chapter 17962, Acts of 1935, and in addition thereto an excise tax under the provisions of Section 5 of Chapter 18011, Acts of 1937. The lower court granted the motion to quash the alternative writ and dismissed the petition. An appeal has been perfected to this Court and the case is here for review.
We agree with counsel for relator that the law requires a person conducting a restaurant, like the one described in the petition and alternative writ, to pay an inspection fee to the Hotel Commission of the State of Florida under the provisions of Section 11 of Chapter 16042, Acts of 1933, as amended by Section 3 of Chapter 17062, Acts of 1933. It likewise became the lawful duty of the relator to pay to the respondent tax collector an additional excise tax under Section 6 of Chapter 18011, Acts of 1937, prior to the issuance of a 1939-1940 license' to operate a restaurant. See State ex rel. Rachel B. Beth and husband v. Burnett, as Tax Collector of Hillsborough County, Florida, this day decided, being a companion case to the one at bar.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
It is so ordered.
Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Brown, Buford and Ti-iomas, J. J., concur.