FRED KENNETH ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Fred Kenneth Robinson was convicted of uttering a forged instrument under Florida law. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly allowed the state to amend the information regarding the specific criminal offense after the jury had been sworn, creating prejudicial surprise and violating the defendant's right to a fair trial.
No, the trial court erred by allowing the amendment of the information after the jury was sworn. Such a material amendment constitutes prejudicial error because it creates potential for surprise and infringes upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, warranting reversal and a new trial.
[1] Amending an information in open court during trial, after arraignment, plea, and jury selection, to charge a different offense of substance, without re-signing, re-sweari…
[2] A substantial amendment to an information during trial, after the jury has been sworn, may infringe upon a defendant's right to a fair trial due to potential surprise.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After a defendant has been arraigned upon an information, entered a plea of not guilty thereto, and a jury selected and sworn to try the issues so joined, is it proper for the trial court, over objection, to permit the assistant county solicitor to alter and amend the information in open court during the trial, regarding a matter of substance, where the amended information is not re-signed by the county solicitor, nor re-sworn, nor the jury re-selected nor re-sworn?”
Statement of the precise appellate issue presented, establishing the improper timing and nature of the amendment
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobinson was charged with violating F.S. 831.06 involving the fictitious signature of a corporate officer. The information was loosely and indefinitel…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Defendant was convicted and sentenced for violation of F.S. 831.02, F.S.A., Laws of 1969, this outlining the offense of uttering a forged instrument. We reverse and remand.
The appellate point as correctly framed by the defendant is:
“After a defendant has been arraigned upon an information, entered a plea of not guilty thereto, and a jury selected and sworn to try the issues so joined, is it proper for the trial court, over objection, to permit the assistant county solicitor to alter and amend the information in open court during the trial, regarding a matter of substance, where the amended information is not re-signed by the county solicitor, nor re-sworn, nor the jury re-selected nor re-sworn?”
It appears that the information filed against the defendant charged him with violating F.S. 831.06, F.S.A., which delineates the offense concerning the fictitious signature of an officer of a corporation. An examination of the information indicates that it was loosely and indefinitely worded and combined features of the two mentioned statutes. In the voir dire the prosecutor misstated on several occasions that the case involved the uttering of a forged instrument, F.S. 831.02, F.S.A., Laws of 1969. After the jury was accepted and sworn the state was allowed to amend the information over the defendant’s objection to charge the offense contained in F.S. 831.02, F.S.A., and eliminate the reference to F.S. 831.06, F.S. A. We believe this was a matter of substance which constituted prejudicial error because of its potential for surprise which would infringe upon the defendant’s right of a fair trial. We reverse upon authority of Wilcox v. State, Fla.App.1971, 248 So.2d 692; Alvarez v. State, 1946, 157 Fla. 254, 25 So.2d 661, and Lawson v. State, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 683, and direct that defendant be afforded a new trial upon the information as amended.
Reversed and remanded.
OWEN, J., and BEASLEY, THOMAS D., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Alvaro Alvarez v. State, 157 Fla. 254 (Fla. 1946)
- United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. ADA A. Tressler, 157 Fla. 254 (Fla. 1946)
- Lawson v. State, 251 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Wilcox v. State, 248 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)