STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN WESLEY MIMS, APPELLEE
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The court holds that it has jurisdiction to review an order of discharge entered under the speedy trial rule.
The State seeks to appeal an order discharging the appellee pursuant to the speedy trial rule. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This is a motion by the appellee to dismiss the appeal herein whereby the State seeks reversal of an order discharging appellee from certain charges against him pursuant to Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.191, 33 F.S.A., known as the speedy trial rule.
By his motion, appellee contends that we have no jurisdiction to review an order of discharge entered under the speedy trial rule. We denied a similar motion in State v. Gravlee, our case No. Q-182, on June 6, 1972, by an unpublished administrative 'order. Thereafter, Gravlee sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court1 seeking to restrain this court from exercising any jurisdiction in the State’s appeal of an order granting Gravlee a discharge under the speedy trial rule. The Supreme Court denied Gravlee’s petition for writ of prohibition on September 12, 1972. Although no opinion was written by the Supreme Court in Gravlee, we can only construe its order of denial as authority for the proposition that we do have jurisdiction to review *53orders granting discharge under the speedy trial rule.
We quite agree. Such an order is in the nature of a final judgment entered by a trial court which we have appellate jurisdiction to review. Article V, Section 5(3) F.S.A. See also the statutory authority granted by Section 924.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
Accordingly, appellee’s motion to dismiss is denied.
SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
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Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n v. Dist. Sch. Bd. OF DE Soto Cnty., 374 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…n the basis of the particular procedural posture of that case, and its holding does not compel rejection of the rule which we have here embraced. We distinguish for the same reason the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Mims, 267 So. 2d 52 (Fla.1st DCA 1972), in which the court referred to a denial by the Supreme Court of a petition for writ of prohibition as “authority for the proposition” that jurisdiction existed, and expressed agreement with that proposition. Having thus disposed…
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State v. W. A. M., 412 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…f appeal from final judgments 1 in juvenile cases. An order discharging a defendant on speedy trial grounds is a final order. [*51] State v. Wise, 336 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); State v. Johnson, 287 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); State v. Mims, 267 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). In this case, the juvenile was not brought to an adjudicatory hearing within the time provided by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.180(a). However, within the time provisions of that rule, the juvenile sought and obtained a…
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State v. Zebedee Johnson, Jr., 287 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…order granting a motion for discharge is in the nature of a final disposition of the proceeding in the trial court and would be subject to being reviewed upon a notice of appeal. Pena v. Schultz, Fla.1971, 245 So. 2d 49; State v. Mims, Fla.App.1972, 267 So. 2d 52; State v. Lott, Fla.1973, 286 So. 2d 565. Certiorari dismissed.…
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