EDWIN M. CHAFFEE, TRUSTEE OF HORACE H. DAY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,

v.

NATHANIEL HAYWARD; HORACE H. DAY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. NATHANIEL HAYWARD

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.

The question of law decided below, and which we are called on to revise, arises on the following facts: On the twenty-second day of October, 1855, the plaintiff in error sued out a writ in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Rhode Island district, against Nathaniel Hayward, styling him as “ of Colchester, in the State of Connecticut, commorant of Providence, in the State of Rhode Island,’’’for the recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in error, by reason of an alleged infringement of a patent right claimed by said plaintiff.

On the same day, the marshal of the Rhode -Island district made return on the writ, that “for want of the body of the within defendant to be by me found within my district, I have . attached,” &c., (enumerating certain real estate lying in the city of Providence, in the State of Rhode Island,) and a still further return of having made further service of the-writ, by attaching all the personal estate of the defendant in the India rubber factory of Hartshorn & Co., and in the store or warehouse No. 7, Dorrance street stores, &c., and “have -left true and attested copies of this writ, with my doings thereon, with the city clerk of the city of Providence, and with John Sweet and William E. Himes, they being in possession of the premises, the defendant having no known place of abode within my district.”

At the November term of the court, a declaration was filed, containing the allegations of citizenship of the plaintiff and defendant, and that the defendant was eommorant of Providence, as in the writ; and at the same term the defendant, in his owfi proper person, pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court, that he was at the time of the pretended service of the writ, and is,, an inhabitant of the district of Connecticut, and not an inhabitant of the district of Rhode Island, nor was he at the time of the pretended service of the writ within the district of Rhode Isl-and; praying the judgment of the court, whether it can or will take cognizance of the action against him.

To this plea the plaintiff, by his. attorney, filed a general demurrer, on which the cause was heard, and at the June term the court overruled the demurrer and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction; upon which, the plaintiff sued, out a writ of error. By the eleventh section of the judiciary act of 1789, it is provided, “That no civil suit in a Circuit or District Court-shall be brought against an inhabitant of the United States by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ.”

It has been several times held by this court as the true con-struction of the foregoing section, that jurisdiction of the person of a defendant, (who is an inhabitant of another State,) can only be obtained, in a civil action, by service of process on his person, within the district where the suit is instituted; and that no jurisdiction can be acquired by attaching property of a non-resident .defendant, pursuant to a State attachment law. The doctrine announced to this effect, in the case of Toland v. Sprague, in 1838, (12 Peters, 327,) has been uniformly followed since, both by this court and at the circuits. (15 Pet., 171; 17 How., 424.)

It is insisted, however, for the plaintiff, that these rulings were had in cases arising where the jurisdiction depended on citizenship; whereas, here the suit is founded on an act of Congress conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts of the United States in suits by inventors against those who infringe their letters patent, including all cases, both at law and in equity, arising under the patent laws, without regard to citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy, and therefore the eleventh section of the judiciary act does hot apply, but the process acts of the State where the suit is brought must govern; and that the act of Congress of May 8th,, 1792, so declares.

The second section of that qct provides, that the forms and modes of proceeding in suits at common law shall be the'same as are now used in the Federal courts, respectively, pursuant to the act of 1789, ch. 21, known as the process act of that year. This act (sec. 2) declares, that until further provision shall be made, and except where by this act “or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided,” the forms of writs and executions, and modes of process in suits at common law, shall be the same in each State, respectively, as are now used or allowed in the Supreme Court-of the same. This was to be the mode of process, unless provision had been made by Congress; and, to the extent that Congress had provided, the State laws should not opérate.

Now, the only statute of the United States then existing, regulating practice, was the judiciary act of 1789, (ch. 20,) which is above recited. The eleventh section is excepted out of and stands unaffected by the subsequent process acts, and is as applicable in this case as it was to those where jurisdiction depended on citizenship. It applies in its terms to all civil suits; it makes no exception, nor can the courts of justice make any.

The judicial , power extends to all cases in law and equity arising under thé Constitution and laws of the United States, and it is pursuant to this clause of. the Constitution that the United States courts are vested -with power to execute the laws respecting inventors and patented inventions; but where suits are to be brought is left to the general law: to wit, to the eleventh section of the judiciary act, which requires personal service of process, within the district where the suit is brought, if the defendant be an inhabitant of another State.

This case, and that of Day against Hayward, depend on the same grounds of jurisdiction, and were both correctly decided in the Circuit Court; and the judgment in each is affirmed.