TURNPIKE COMPANY
v.
THE STATE

U.S. | 1865-12-01
3 Wall. 210 Supreme Court of the United States (1865) Caution
Also reported at: 18 L. Ed. 180 · SCDB 1865-044 · 1865 U.S. LEXIS 700
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

A turnpike company challenged the state's authority to charter a competing railroad, claiming it violated exclusive privileges granted in the turnpike's charter. The Supreme Court held that the turnpike company had not been granted exclusive privileges, either expressly or by implication, and therefore the state had the authority to authorize the railroad's construction; even if the charter had contained such privileges, the company's proper remedy would have been to seek an injunction against the railroad rather than to neglect road maintenance while continuing to collect tolls.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice NELSON

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The difficulty of the argument in behalf of the turnpike company, and which lies at the foundation of the defence is, that there is no contract in the charter of the turnpike company that prohibited the legislature from authorizing the construction of the rival railroad. No exclusive privileges had been conferred upon it, either in express terms, or by necessary implication; and hence whatever may have been the general injurious effects and consequences to the company, from the construction and operation of the rival road, they are simply misfortunes which may excite our sympathies, but are not the subject of legal redress.

It might have been very proper for the State, when chartering the railroad, to have provided for compensation for the prospective loss to the turnpike company, as has frequently been done in other States, under similar circumstances; but this was a question resting entirely with the legislature of the State, and their action is conclusive on the subject.

There is another answer to the defence in this case, even assuming that the charter of the turnpike company contained exclusive privileges that forbade the legislature of the State incorporating the railroad company. [See supra, p. 51; The Binghamton Bridge.]

The remedy was not in neglecting to repair the road, and at the same time collect the tolls. It was in restraining, by •the proper proceedings, the railroad company from constructing their road. The breach of the contract on the part of the State furnished no excuse for the turnpike company in disregarding their part of it which was a burden, to wit, the repairs, while, at the same time, insisting upon the observance of the part beneficial, to wit, the collection of the tolls.

J UDGMENT AFFIRMED.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, supra; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 625; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 548; Turnpike Co. v. The State, 3 Wall. 210, 213; Hamilton Gets Light Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U. S. 258, 268; Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 664. Compare Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388. Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191 U. S. 150; Helena Water Work…
  • …revents the State from granting to other person^ the privilege of supplying, during’ the same period, the same corporation and people with water drawn in like manner from a different, stream or'river.” What was said in Turnpike Company v. The State, 3 Wall. 210, 213, is quite applicable to the present case. The State of Maryland incorporated a company with power to consti’uct a turnpike between Baltimore and Washington; and subsequently incorporated a railroad company, with authority to construct a railroa…
  • Pearsall v. Great N. Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646 (U.S. 1896)
    …e franchise to the first grantee may be wholly destroyed. This principle was laid down at an early day in the case of the Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, and has been steadily adhered to ever since. Turnpike Company v. The State, 3 Wall. 210; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75. If however there be an exclusive provision, as, for instance, in the charter of [*665] a bridge company that it shall not be lawful for any person to erect anot…

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