UNITED STATES
v.
FISK
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In United States v. Fisk, the Supreme Court addressed the construction of a federal statute governing licensing duties for brokers and bankers engaged in stock transactions. The Court held that the statute's language requiring "all brokers and bankers doing business as brokers" to pay certain duties must be construed according to its plain terms, and the Court refused to interpolate words into the statute to expand its scope beyond what was expressly written. The decision established that courts must ascertain legislative intent through the statute's actual language rather than amending statutes through judicial construction, even when the legislature's underlying purpose might have been broader.
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Mr. Justice G-KIEB,
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the construction of statutes, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled to construe “ or” as meaning “ and,” and again “ and” as meaning “ or.”
The purpose and intent of the legislature, in the amendment made to the ninth paragraph, was evidently not to change the correct definition given of the term “ broker,” and to make it mean that every man who sold his own stock was a broker, and liable to pay fifty dollars for a license. The obvious purpose of the amendment was to compel brokers to render an account of all sales made, whether for themselves or others, and to pay the duty on them. As is often the case in statutes, though the intention is clear, the words used to express it may be ill chosen.
The evil intended to be remedied by the amendment was transparent. If the amendment had been properly expressed, it should have been added as a proviso to the 99th section, which relates to the rates of duty to be paid on sales made in the stock-market by brokers or others licensed and doing business as such, and in the preceding case the court have so construed it.
Now, a banker pays a much higher license tax than a broker, and is permitted to “prosecute or carry on” the business or profession of a broker without paying any further license; but if he prefers, he may not combine that business with his own. The 110th section prescribes the duties to be paid by a banker. It is not amended so as to require him to render an account of his purchases or sales of government stocks for himself. The case before us, therefore, presents no other question than the construction of the 99th section. It enacts that “all brokers and bankers doing business as brokers shall be subject to the following duties,” &c.
Now, in order to subject a banker to the duties prescribed by this section, we are asked to interpolate the important word “ not,” and to construe it as including bankers who do not, as well as those who do transact “ business as brokers.”. This would not be a construction of the statute, but an amendment thereof in direct contradiction of its language. This we do not feel at liberty to make.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Addie Payne v. Payne, 82 Fla. 219 (Fla. 1921)…misapprehension of the comprehensive and liberal purpose and intent of the statute. The use of the word “and” in the statute is not intended to make the elements of proof conjunctive or interdependent. See United States v. Fisk, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 445, 18 L. Ed. 243; 25 R. C. L. p. 977; 2 C. J. 1339; 36 Cyc. 1123. Reversed. Browne, C. J., and Taylor, J., concur. Ellis and West, J. J., dissent.…
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De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1956)…often used as a careless substitute for the word “and”; that is, it is often used in phrases where “and” would express the thought with greater clarity. That trouble with the word has been with us for a long time: see, e. g., United States v. Fisk, 3 Wall. 445. In this instance, we need look no further than the very next clause in this same section of the Copyright Act for an example of this careless usage: “. . . or if such author, widow, widower [*574] or children be not living, then the author’s execut…
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Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951)
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