WAYNE ZACHARY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Wayne Zachary appealed his conviction for throwing a missile at a motor vehicle occupied by Robert Brostek, arguing that Florida Statute Section 790.19 was unconstitutionally vague. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that throwing a bottle at a police van is prohibited conduct.
The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Any person of ordinary intelligence would have fair notice that wantonly and maliciously throwing a twelve-ounce soft drink bottle at a police van from less than fifteen yards away with sufficient force is prohibited by the statute, and this satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
[1] A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that their contemplated conduct is forbidden.
[2] A statute is sufficiently definite if its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”
Establishes the applicable constitutional test for vagueness challenges to criminal statutes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn information charged appellant with wantonly and maliciously throwing a missile at a motor vehicle occupied by Robert Brostek. The specific facts un…
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An information was filed against appellant charging that he “did wantonly and maliciously throw at a certain motor vehicle, a more particular description of which is to the State Attorney unknown, a certain missile which would produce death or great bodily harm, a better description of which is to the State Attorney unknown, which said motor vehicle was then and there being used and occupied by Robert Brostek.” A motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the statute defining such offense viz. Section 790.19 F.S.A.1 was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain was overruled by the trial court, the appellant waived trial by jury, was duly tried by the court and found and adjudged to be guilty. This appeal comes direct to us by virtue of the decision of the trial cortrt sustaining the constitutionality of said statute.
The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.2 Appellant in his brief recognizes this basic test, citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612-617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989-996, to the following effect: “The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”
Measured by the above test which is conceded to be the correct test by both *671appellant and appellee, we find that this statute is impervious to a constitutional attack upon the grounds stated. We hold that any person of ordinary intelligence would have notice that wantonly and maliciously throwing a twelve ounce soft drink bottle at a police van from a distance of less than fifteen yards with the force sufficient to achieve a flat trajectory (the facts upon which the trial court adjudged the defendant to be guilty) is forbidden by the statute. That is all the law requires.
Affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (36 total)
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Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)…neither vague nor indefinite but rather is sufficiently clear to give reasonable notice to a probationer or parolee as to what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. See Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934); Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1972); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla.1972); Newman v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla.1973); State v. Lindsay, Fla., 284 So. 2d 377, decided October 24, 1973. Such criminal conduct as would give rise to p…
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State v. DYE, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977)…e hold that the statute conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1973); Newman v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla.1973); Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1972). Further, the discretion statutorily given an “authorized person” is mandated by the nature of the problem presented. While we recognize that a valid statute may be unconstitutionally applied, the precise limitations to be placed on the w…
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State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1985)…e is sufficiently clear to provide a definite warning of what conduct will be deemed a violation; that is, whether ordinary people will understand what the statute requires or forbids, measured by common understanding and practice. Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1972); Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934). Section 817.563 defines an offense having two constituent factual requirements that must be shown. The first is for a person to agree, consent, or offer to sell a controlled substance t…
Previewing 3 of 36 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1926)
- United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (U.S. 1954)