THE SEA WITCH
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During the Civil War, the Supreme Court considered whether the merchant vessel Sea Witch had violated the Union blockade of Confederate ports by deviating from the direct course to New Orleans, suggesting an intent to reach the blockaded port of Galveston instead. The Court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the vessel's altered course was sufficiently explained by weather conditions and the ordinary navigation practices of vessels bound for New Orleans under blockade conditions, rather than evidence of intent to breach the blockade.
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The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The only ground of suspicion that a violation of the blockade was intended is the fact that the vessel, when captured, was out of the most direct regular course to New Orleans, and in a part of the gulf where she would very probably have been had her real destination been Galveston. But we think this is sufficiently accounted for by the weather, and by the probability that such a vessel, really bound for New Orleans, would prefer to keep at no greater distance from the shore than the blockade would require, rather than take the more direct course across the gulf.
It was stated in the argument that the cargo of the vessel umuld not command at New Orleans so good a price as at Vera Cruz; and this circumstance, if proved, would be entitled to great weight. But there is no evidence of that sort in the record.
On the whole, therefore, we think that the decree of the District Court was correct, and shall order that it be
Affirmed.
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