STANSBURY
v.
UNITED STATES
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Stansbury claimed the Secretary of War promised to pay him for services rendered to the government, but the Supreme Court held that the promise was unenforceable because no legal authority or congressional appropriation existed to authorize either the appointment or the payment. The Court affirmed that federal law prohibited officers and clerks from receiving additional compensation for extra services unless specifically authorized by law with a corresponding appropriation, and this statutory bar applied regardless of the Secretary's good faith.
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Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant insists that the written promise of the Secretary to pay him the value of his services, is a binding obligation on the government. But this is not so, for ho authority of law existed for the promise. The secretary could not pay the claim, because there was'n.o appropriation to pay it, and he was not authorized by Congress to create an agency to perform the service in question. lie undoubtedly acted in good faith with Stausbury, and supposed that Congress would approve the mode he adopted for obtaining useful information, and ratify^ his proceedings; and J¿s promise, under the circumstances, must be considered as a dependent one, to take effect, if Congress appropriated money.to enable him to comply with it. Congress having failed to make the appropriation, the secretary was justified in refusing to pay the claim.
But he was justified in hie refusal on another ground. The payment of the claim was forbidden by positive law.
The second section of the act of August 23d. 18.42, declares that no officer of the government, drawing a fixed salary, shall receive additional compensation for any service, unless it is authorized by law and a specific appropriation made to pay it. When Stansbury was appointed in 1851, this law was in force, and afforded notice to all employees of the government, of the policy of Congress on the subject to which it relates. The law was passed to remedy an evil which had existed, of detailing officers with fixed pay to perform duties outside of their regular employment, and paying them for it, when the government was entitled, without this double pay, to all their services. The law prohibited, and was intended to do so, the allowance of such claims as these, madé by public officers, for extra compensation, on the ground of extra services.
But. the appellant insists, if the above act embraced.clerks in' the departments, its operation has been withdrawn from them by the twelfth section of the act of 26th of August, 1842. It is difficult to see how this conclusion is reached, because this section refuses to pay clerks or other officers in the departments for doing the duties of other clerks or officers, and refuses, further, to pay them for extra services of any kind.
There is no inconsistency between the provisions of the two acts, which were passed within few-days of each other, and were parts of a system, intended for the guidance of those in the employ of the government. These provisions .furnished notice to all in authority, that in no event could clerks in the departments be paid for doing the work of their fellow-clerks, nor could they be paid for any other service, unless it was authorized by law, and followed by an appropriation to pay for it.
Stausbury’s appointment was not authorized by law, nor was there any appropriation to pay for the services which he expected to render the department.
It follows, therefore, that the transaction between Secretary Stuart and himself was in violation of the statute, and cannot be the foundation of an action.
Judgment affirmed.
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