NAILOR
v.
WILLIAMS

U.S. | 1868-12-01
8 Wall. 107 Supreme Court of the United States (1868) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 19 L. Ed. 348 · 1868 U.S. LEXIS 1086 · SCDB 1869-011
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

In this case concerning the admission of testimony at trial, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court erroneously permits a witness to answer an illegal question, the error is not reversible unless the complaining party includes the witness's actual answer in the bill of exceptions to show how the testimony was injurious. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where a court refuses to permit a legal answer, which constitutes reversible error without requiring the party to prove harm. Since the record did not contain the witness's responses, the Court could not determine that error occurred and affirmed the judgment below.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice MILLER

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

If a question is' asked of a witness on the stand, the answer to which is pertinent and legal testimony, and the court refuses to permit the ..witness to answer, this is error which a revising court will correct, because the injury to the party consists in the refusal of the court to permit the answer to be given, and he can do nothing more to prove the wrong done him than to show that he as.ked a legal question, the answer to which, by ¡the action of the court, was denied him.

But where a question is asked wdiich is illegal only because it may elicit improper testimony, and the court permits it to be answered against the objection, of the other party, the injury done the party is by the answer, and notwithstanding the erroneous ruling of the court, if the witness knows' nothing of the matter to which he is interrogated, or if his answer is favorable to the objecting party, it works him no injury. If it does, he can show it by making the answer a part of the bill of exceptions, and unless he does this there is.no error of which a revising court can take notice.1

Eor this reason, and also because there is nothing in the bill of exceptions which enables us to say that the questions themselves exceeded the reasonable license which a court, in its discretion, may allow in cross-examination, we are of opinion that no error is shown by these bills of exception.

As they constitute the only matters alleged against the judgment of the court below, it is

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (U.S. 1931)
    …by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. Nailor v. Williams, 8 Wall. 107, 109; see People v. Stevenson 103 Cal. App. 82; cf. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U. S. 448. In this respect a summary denial of the right of cross-examination is distinguishable from the erroneous admission of harmless testimony. Nailor v. Willi…
  • Lindsey v. United States, 133 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
    …by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. Nailor v. Williams, 8 Wall. 107, 109, 19 L.Ed. 348; see People v. Stevenson, 103 Cal.App. 82, 284 P. 487; cf. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345. In this respect a summary denial of the right of cross-examination is distinguishable from the errone…
  • United States v. OTT, 489 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1973)
    …by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right hnd withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. Nailor v. Williams, 8 Wall. 107, 109, [19 L.Ed. 348]; see People v. Stevenson, 103 Cal.App. 82 [284 P. 487, 491]; cf. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 [47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345]. In this respect a summary denial of the right of cross-examination is distinguishable from t…

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