UNITED STATES

v.

GROSSMAYER

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

Grossmayer insists that he is within the protection of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, but it is hard to see on what ground he can base this claim for protection. It was natural that Grossmayer should desire to be paid, and creditable to Einstein to wish to discharge his obligation to him, but the same thing can be said of very many persons who were similarly situated during the war, and if all persons in this condition had been allowed to do what was done in this case, it is easy to see that it would have produced great embarrassment and obstructed very materially the operations of the army. It has been found necessary, as soon as war is commenced, that business intercourse should cease between the citizens of the respective parties engaged in it, and this necessity is so great that all writers on public law agree that it is unlawful, without any express declaration of the sovereign on the subject.

But Congress did not wish to leave any one in ignorance of the effect of war in this regard, for as early as the 13th of June, 1861, it passed a Non-intercourse Act, which prohibited all commercial intercourse between the States in insurrection and the rest of the. United States. It is true the President could allow a restricted trade, if he thought proper; but in so far as he did allow it, it had to be conducted according to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.

There is no pretence, however, that this particular transaction was authorized by any one connected with the Treasury Department, and it was, therefore, not only inconsistent with the duties growing out of a state of war, but in open violation of a statute on the subject. A prohibition of all intercourse with an enemy during the war affects debtors and creditors on either side, equally with those who do not bear that relation to each other. We are not disposed to deny the doctrine that a resident in the territory of one of the belligerents may have, in time of war, an agent residing in the territory of the other, to whom his debtor could pay his debt in money,- or deliver to him property in discharge of it, but in such a case the agency must have been created before the war. began, for there is no power to appoint an agent for any purpose after hostilities have actually commenced, and to this effect are all the authorities. The reason why this cannot be done is obvious, for while the war lasts nothing which depends on commercial intercourse is permitted. In this case, if Einstein is to be considered as the agent of Grossmayer to buy the cotton, the act appointing him was illegal, because it was done by means of a direct communication through a messenger who was in some manner not stated in the record able to pass, during the war, between Macon and New York. It was not necessary to make the act unlawful that Grossmayer should have communicated personally with Einstein. The business intercourse through a middle man, which resulted in establishing the agency, is equally within the condemnation of the law

Besides, if, as is conceded, Grossmayer was prohibited from trading directly with the enemy, how can the purchase in question be treated as lawful when it was made for him by an agent appointed after his own disability to deal at all with the insurgents was created?

It is argued that the purchase by Einstein was ratified by Grossmayer, and that being so the case is relieved of difficulty; but this is a mistaken view of the principle of ratification, for a transaction originally unlawful cannot be made any better by being ratified.

In any aspect of this case, whether the relation of debtor and creditor continued, or was changed to that of principal and agent, the claimant cannot recover. f As he was prohibited during the war from having any dealings with Einstein, it follows that nothing which both or either of them did in this Case could have the effect to vest in him the title to the cotton in question.

Not being the owner of the property he has no claim against the United States.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enter an order

Dismissing the petition.