LINTHICUM
v.
RAY
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Linthicum claimed rights to a wharf based on an 1804 deed from the Lowndes to the Johns that he derived from, but the Supreme Court held that this deed granted only a limited right to use the specific wharf structure then existing for mooring and loading vessels, not a perpetual right to the land or the authority to rebuild or maintain a wharf. The Court affirmed judgment for the defendant, reasoning that the grant was in gross and not appurtenant to any land, and therefore terminated with the destruction of the original structure.
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Mr. Justice FIELD,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
We do not deem it important to consider whether the conveyance to Smith from Templeman, the trustee, was authorized by the power contained in the deed to the latter, or whether the subsequent conveyances under Smith operated to vest a good title to the land upon which the present wharf is situated, or such a right of wharfage as to authorize the construction and exclusive use of the present wharf. The possession of the defendant under color and with claim of title is sufficient to put the plaintiff upon proof of a better title to the wharf, or, at least, of an equal right with the defendant to its use. And such proof he has not produced. The deed of the two Lowndes to the Johns in 1804, under which he derives all the claim he possesses, only conferred a right to the use of the wharf then in existence, and not any general right of wharfage, or any right to the land covered by the wharf. Its language is that it grants the right “of using the wharf built” by the Lowndes, referring clearly to the structure then erected. And the right to use the wharf is limited to that of mooring to it the ships and vessels of the grantees, for loading and unloading, and of passing over it goods imported or exported by them. The deed con-* tains no provision for keeping the wharf in repair, or for building a new one in case of its destruction, or any clause indicating an intention to confer any right or privilege of greater duration than that of the structure then existing.
Nor was the right to use the wharf made appurtenant to the twenty-feet lot, situated on the north side of Water Street, by being conveyed to the Johns in the same instrument. It was in no way connected with the enjoyment or use of the lot, and a right not thus connected cannot be annexed as an incident to land so as to become appurtenant to it.*
The right was not attached as an incident to any estate; it passed by a grant in gross, and was necessarily limited in its duration by the existence of the structure with which it was connected.
Judgment aeeirmed.
*
Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 Com. Bench, 164.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1894)…r, even if the pier had been unlawfully erected by the defendants as against the State, the plaintiffs had no right to pull it down or injure it, and,upon the facts of the case were mere trespassers upon the defendants’ possession. Linthicum v. Ray, 9 Wall. 241; Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gaslight Co., 42 N. Y. 384; Harrington v. Edwards, 17 Wisconsin, 604; Johnson v. Barret, Aleyn, 10, 11. In Railroad Co. v. Sehurmeir, the plaintiff claimed title to lots in a block in the city of St. Paul and State of Minnesota…
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New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. Parker, 143 U.S. 42 (U.S. 1892)…not be appurtenant to its road. In line with this are the earlier cases of Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25, holding that the soil and freehold of a street' did not pass as appurtenant to a lot of land fronting upon such street. So in Linthicum v. Ray, 9 Wall. 241, it was said that the right to use a wharf would not pass as appurtenant to a lot, as it was not in any way connected with the. .enjoyment or use of the lot, and a right not so connected -could not be annexed as an incident to land so as to become a…
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Potomac Steamboat Co. & Others v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Co., 109 U.S. 672 (U.S. 1884)…f the. title, from the remainder of the. original tract, to the whole of which it had formerly pertained. In reference to the squares and lots lying north of the street, it may be said of the wharfage right claimed, as was said in Linthicum v. Ray, 9 Wall. 241, 243, “ It was in no way connected with the enjoyment of use of the lot, and a right not thus connected cannot be annexed as an incident to land, so as to become appurtenant to it.” A riparian proprietor, in the language of Mr. Justice Miller in Ya…
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