EX PARTE GRAHAM
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Duncan Kenner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a district court from entertaining his libel of review challenging a confiscation decree that had resulted in the sale of his property to Graham and Day during the Civil War. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue prohibition because the underlying confiscation proceeding was not an admiralty matter, and the Court could only issue such writs to district courts acting as admiralty courts, leaving the petitioners' remedy to be through writs of error.
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Mr. Justice'SWAYNE-stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.
A rule was granted by this court that the district judge show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue agree,-ably to the prayer of the petitioners.
The petition upon which the rule was founded discloses, so far as it is necessary to state them, the following facts:
The United States instituted in the District Court of the United States.for the Eastern District of Louisiana, under the act of Congress approved July 17th, 1862, entitled “An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,”-' proceedings in confiscation against sixteen lots of ground, the property of Duncan Kenner. The lots .were condemned as forfeited to the United States and ordered to be sold by the marshal. This was accordingly done. Graham and Day became the purchasers of certain portions of the property. They complied with the conditions of the 'sale and received deeds from the marshal. ' The court ordered the proceeds of the sale, less the costs, to be paid over to the United States. Subsequently-, on the 9th of February, 1869, Kenner, as is alleged for the purpose of clouding the' title of the purchasers, and of annoying and harassing them, filed in said court what purports to be a libel of review:, wherein he prayed that the decree in confiscation condemning.the property and ordering it to be sold, should be reviewed and reversed for errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
On the 29th of November, 1869, for the same purposes as is alleged, he filed, by leave of the court, an amendment to . his. original libel of review, whereby and by process duly served upon them, Graham, and Day were made parties to the proceeding.
In addition to the prayer of the original libel, the amendment prays that they should render an account of the rents and profits of the property while in their possession, and that they should be required respectively to pay to Kenner such sums as should be found due to him.
The district judge, it is alleged, holds that the proceeding in confiscation was a proceeding in admiralty, and that it . was therefore competent for him to entertain the libel of review and to exercise the jurisdiction which it invoked. •
The jurisdiction is denied by the petitioners and a remedy is prayed for by a writ of prohibition.
The district judge has filed an answer to the rule, but the . view which we take of the case renders its consideration unnecessary.
Our jurisdiction is specific-and limited. It is defined by the Constitution and laws-of the United States. We can exercisé nóne but what is conferred by one or the other. The thirteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789* authorizes this court “ to issue writs of prohibition to the District Courts -when proceeding as courts of admiralty.”
The question whether the District Court, in entertaining the libel of review, is proceeding as a court of admiralty, meets'us, therefore,-at,the threshold of the case before us. It is only in süch cases that it is competent for this court to issue the writ.* The seventh section of the act. of 1862,† under which the decree sought to be reviewed whs made, provides that proceedings against the property seized shall be in rem, and “ shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or in revenue cases.” It is too clear to admit of doubt that the original case was not one in admiralty, and it is equally clear that the proceeding sought to be prohibited is-not within that category.‡
The supplemental case is an elongation of the original case, and necessarily of the same nature and jurisdictional character..
These conclusions are fatal to the ease of the petitioners. If the District Court shall err in the proceedings upon the libel of review, the remedy of the petitioners will be by a writ of error from the Circuit to the District Court, and, if need be, finally by a like writ from this court to the Circuit Court.
The rule is discharged and the.
Motion denied.
*
*
United States v. Peters, 3 Dallas, 121; Ex parte Christy, 3 Howard, 292.
†
12 Stat. at Large, 589.
‡
The Union Insurance Co. v. United States, 6 Wallace, 759; United States v. Armstrong’s Foundry, Ib. 766; United States v. Hart, Ib. 770, The Sarah, 8 Wheaton, 891.
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Eureka Prods., Inc. v. Mulligan, 108 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1940)…lance to a suit in admiralty does not go beyond the process and the initial pleadings, even in cases where the statute providing for confiscation directs that the proceedings shall conform to proceedings in admiralty as near as may be. In re Graham, 10 Wall. 541, 19 L.Ed. 981; 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States, 226 U.S. 172, 33 S.Ct. 50, 57 L.Ed. 174. It follows that the decree of condemnation and writ of destruction remained in full force, notwithstanding the appeal, and justified the marsha…
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Ex parte Joins, 191 U.S. 93 (U.S. 1903)…he District Courts is confined to cases where those courts are “ proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Rev. Stat. § 688. Ex parte The City Bank of New Orleans, 3 How. 292, 322 ; Ex parte Gordon, 1 Black, 503; Ex parte Graham, 10 Wall. 541; Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68. As to thie jurisdiction in other cases, whether inherent or under Rev. Stat. § 716, see In re Rice, 155 U. S. 396; In re Huguley Manufacturing Co., 184 U. S. 297; In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 462. Again we need not c…
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Ex parte Waples, 38 L. Ed. 1088 (U.S. 1894)…Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court. The facts are the same in this case, and the same questions are involved, as in the preceding case of Ex parte Graham and Day, No. 9, just decided, 10 Wall. 541, and this case is disposed of in the same way. The same entry will be made in both cases.…