MILLER ET AL.
v.
THE STATE
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A quo warranto action brought nominally in the name of New York State but actually on the relation of seven individuals claiming to be wrongfully ousted directors of a railroad corporation sought preferential hearing under an 1870 federal statute granting priority to cases where a State is a party. The Supreme Court denied the motion for advancement, holding that because the suit was brought by private parties suing on the relation of the State rather than being a suit by the State itself, it fell outside the statute's scope and did not qualify for preferential treatment over other civil cases between private parties.
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Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
The motion is that the cause be advanced, and that it be heard at such time as the court shall direct, in preference to civil causes between private parties.
Founded as the motion is, upon the act of Congress of the thii’tieth of June, 1870, it becomes necessary to inquire and determine whether the case is within the'terms of that act, as if it is the motion should be granted, and the-.cause set for hearing as there directed.
Provision is there made to the effect that in all suits apd actions now pending, or which may hereafter be brought, in a Federal court, whether the suit, is original or brought into said courts by appeal or writ of error or by removal from.a' State court, wherein a State is a party, or where the'execution of the revenue laws of any State may be enjoined or stayed by judicial order or process, it shall be the duty of ’ any court in which such case may be pending, on sufficient reason shown, to give such cause the preference and priority over all other civil causes pending in such court between private parties.
Reliance, however, is placed, in support of thé motion, upon the next clause of the act, which provides that the State, or the party claiming under the-laws of the State, the execution of whose revenue laws is enjoined or suspended, shall have a right to have such cause heard at any time after such cause is docketed in such court in preference to any other civil cause pending in such court between, private parties, as provided in the last phrase of the preceding clause.* •
.No objection to-the motion is made by the defendants. Instead of that they have filed one to the same effect, but such motions are not granted as of course, even when both parties concur, as such an order, if improperly made, would prejudice the rights of other parties on the calendar, and in view of that consideration it becomes uecessary to determine whether the ease is onewhere the parties, or either of them, are entitled to such preference, and to enable us to determine that point we have examined the record, and are satisfied that the motion must be denied.
The action was one in the nature of a quo warranto to try the title of the* defendants, as. directors of the Rochester and Genesee Valley Railroad, a corporation created by the laws of the State of New York, and doing business in that State, and the real controversy is between two sets of directors as to which set is entitled to manage and control the affairs of the corporation.
Both parties assume in argument that the suit is in the name of the State, or the people of the State alone, and it is upon that ground that it is claimed that the motion ought to be granted; and if the fact was so it may be conceded that the cause ought to be advanced. Such, however, is not the fact. On the contrary, the suit was brought not only in the name of the People of the State of New York, but also in the name of seven persons claiming to be directors of the railroad company, and that they, as such, are entitled to manage and control its affairs or to participate in such management and control; and they charge that the defendants, without any legal authority, right, or warrant whatsoever, have usurped and entered upon said offices of directors of the said corporation, and that they still unlawfully hold and exercise those rights and franchises. Subsequently, when the cause was transferred to the general term, the names of the seven directors joined as plaintiffs in the court of original jurisdiction were dropped in the title of the case, but the whole proceedings in the case in all the courts of the State 'where the case was litigated were upon the declaration as originally filed, without any amendment in that behalf. Evidently the suit, is one in the name of the State, on the relation of the seven persons who charge that the defendants have unlawfully usurped the offices of directors from which they have been unlawfully ousted, or to which they are justly 'entitled by a legal election. Suggestion may be made that the State is the only party plaiutiff named in the writ of error, but it is the duty of the court in such la case to open the record and ascertain whether the ease in point of fact is one where the parties are entitled to be heard in preference to other civil causes between party and party pending on the calendar. Such a case is not within the act of Congress, and the
Motion is denied.
*
16 Stat. at Large, 176.