UNITED STATES
v.
WORMER
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The federal government contracted to purchase horses from Wormer but imposed inspection regulations requiring horses to be held in a government yard during inspection and prohibiting the owner from handling them, along with branding procedures to prevent resubmission of rejected horses. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims' judgment in Wormer's favor, holding that the government had the authority to prescribe reasonable regulations for horse inspection to prevent fraud, and that Wormer could not recover damages for losses he voluntarily incurred by abandoning the contract rather than comply with these regulations.
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Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
We think that the Court of Claims erred in its finding and judgment in this case. The government clearly had the right to prescribe regulations for the inspection of horses, and there was great need of strictness in this regard, for frauds were constantly perpetrated. We see nothing unreasonable in the regulations complained of. It is well known that horses may be prepared and fixed up to appear bright and smart for a few hours, and it was altogether reasonable that they should be placed in the government yard for the period required, and that no person interested in them should be permitted to manipulate them whilst under inspection. The branding was also a proper and necessary precaution to prevent the same horses being presented a second time after condemnation. The branding on the foot was of slight importance, and the brand on the shoulder was not to be applied except in eases of absolute fraud. A person guilty of fraud would have no fight to complain of the regulation being carried into effect.
As the government had the right to prescribe all proper and reasonable regulations on the subject, and as the regulations prescribed do not seem to have been unreasonable, the claimant cannot complain. If he chose, under these circumstances, to filing up his contract, he must be content to suffer any incidental damage which he may have incurred in making preparations for its performance. It was a damage voluntarily sustained, and the-maxim, volenti non jit injuria, applies to the case.
Decree reversed, and the court below directed to
Dismiss the petition.