CLINKENBEARD ET AL.
v.
UNITED STATES

U.S. | 1874-10-01
21 Wall. 65 Supreme Court of the United States (1874) Caution
Also reported at: 22 L. Ed. 477 · SCDB 1874-024 · 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1341
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

A distillery owner was assessed a capacity tax for eight days during which his distillery was legally inactive due to government omission and accident, and the Supreme Court held that a defendant sued for tax collection may assert as a defense that the tax was illegally assessed, even without prior appeal to the Commissioner, since an illegal assessment cannot form the basis for a valid tax collection action. The Court established that while administrative tax assessments are quasi-judicial and cannot be collaterally attacked when made within proper jurisdiction, assessments of property or operations that are not taxable are fundamentally illegal and unenforceable.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justiee BRADLEY

Mr. Justiee BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

If the facts were as set up in the defence, it is difficult to see how the assessment in this case could have been legal. The distiller, without any fault of his own, but by the omission of the government itself, was prevented from operating his distillery for the first four days for which he was taxed, and his distillery was inactive from an accident, and in charge of a government officer, as prescribed by law, for four other days. He could not, without a breach of law, commence distilling till a storekeeper was assigned him, and he acted in. compliance with the law when his distillery was stopped 1)3’ accident. To charge him with the capacity-tax during those eight da3's was unjust and oppressive.

It is suggested by the government counsel that the case does not show that the assessment was upon the capacity of the distillery; that the quantity of material returned by him as actually used during the month may have warranted the assessment. But the offer was to show that the assessment included those eight days, and the declaration charges, as a breach, that Clinkenbeard did not pay the tax assessed upon the aggregate capacity of the distillery for the month in question. So far as appeared the facts set up in defence rendered the assessment clearly illegal.

But another point raised by the government counsel is that the assessment, not having been appealed from, was res judicata and conclusive, and defendant was precluded from showing the contrary.

It is true that the Internal-Revenue Act of 1S64 authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on appeal to him made, to remit, refund, and pay back all taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,* and the amended act of July 13th, 1866, declares that no suit shall be maintained for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected until such appeal shall have been made, and a decision had.† The suit thus prohibited is a suit brought by the person taxed to recover back a tax illegally assessed and collected. This is different from the case now under consideration, which is a suit brought by the government for collecting the tax, and the person taxed (together with his sureties) is defendant instead of plaintiff. No statute is cited to show that he cannot, when thus sued, set up the defence that the tax was illegally assessed, although he may not have appealed to the commissioner. Is he precluded by any general rule of law from setting up such a defence? lias an assessment of a tax so far the force and effect of a judicial sentence that it cannot be attacked collaterally, but only by some direct proceeding, such as an appeal or certiorari, for setting it aside ?

It is undoubtedly true that the decisions of an assessor or board of assessors, like those of all other administrative commissioners, are of a quasi judicial character, and cannot be questioned collaterally when made within the scope of their jurisdiction. But if they assess persons, property, or operations not taxable, such assessment is illegal and cannot form the basis of an action at law for the collection of the tax, however efficacious it may be for the protection of ministerial officers charged with the duty of actual collection by virtue of a regular warrant or authority therefor. When the government elects to resort to the aid of the courts it must abide by the legality of the tax. When it follows the statute its officers have the protection of the statute, and parties must comply with the requirements thereof before they can prosecute as plaintiffs.

The JUDGMENT reversed, and

A VENIRE DE NOVO AWARDED.

*

Section 44.

Section 19.

Dissent
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD,

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD,

with whom concurred Justices SWAYNE, DAYIS, and STRONG, dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case because the evidence offered by the distiller to show that the assessment in question covered eight days in which his distillery could not be operated was not an answer to the whole declaration; nor could it be, as the assessment was for a deficiency and covered the regular tax for a whole month.

Suppose the evidence was admissible, still if it had been admitted it would only have shown that the'assessment was excessive in amount, in which state of the case all will agree, I suppose, that the defence must have failed, as the ease showed that no appeal had ever been taken to the Secretary of the Treasury, as required by the act of Congress.

Such must be the rule, else it will follow that nothing can be collected of the taxpayer in any case where the assessment is for an amount greater than that authorized by law, which is a proposition at war with the whole system of Federal taxation.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (U.S. 1921)
    …e provided in this Act.” This shows clearly enough the peremptory character of this first step. It cannot be supposed that a resort to the Courts is to be less immediately effective than a taking with the strong, hand. Clinkenbeard v. United States, 21 Wall. 65, has no applies tion. That was debt on a bond for a tax and turned on the right of the Government to the tax, not on possession. By-a later paragraph “the sole relief and remedy of any person having any claim to any . . . property ” transferred to t…
  • …the act, nor, if made, conclusive upon either party, and that in an action to recover the tax the controlling question is not what has been assessed, but what is by law due. Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; Clinkenbeard v. United States, 21 Wall. 65. The president of the corporation testified that in' 1868 the United States made a demand upon the company for some $350,000 alleged to be due for such taxes for the same period; that the company resisted the demand, and through him as its counsel…

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