SECOMBE

v.

RAILROAD COMPANY

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and the only material point for inquiry is, whether on the whole case the decision of the court below, which was adverse to the plaintiff, was correct.

Whether the Minnesota Central Railroad Company, under whom the defendant claims — and which occupied for railroad purposes the land in question long before the deeds of quitclaim under which the plaintiff sets up title were made— whether this company had the right to condemn the land and took the proper steps to condemn it, depends of necessity on the laws of the State; and if these laws have been construed by the highest court of the State in a case similar in character to the one before us, the Federal courts are relieved of all difficulty.

We do not feel called upon to enter into an examination of the several acts on this subject, both public and private, which are quite numerous, in order to show that the Minnesota Central Company had a corporate existence, and was therefore capable of performing an act of condemnation. It is enough to say that the point is settled in favor of the company by the decision and reasoning of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company v. Parcher. The Minnesota Central Company was authorized by law to procure the condemnation of land for the use of its road, and from the findings (f fact by the Circuit Court it sufficiently appears that the statutory provisions on the subject were observed.

It is no longer an open question in this country that the mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, in the absence of any provision iu the organic law prescribing a contrary course, is within the discretion of the legislature. There is no limitation upon the power of the legislature in this respect, if the purpose be a public one, and just compensation be paid or tendered to the owner for the property taken. This general rule has received the sanction of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in analogous cases to the one at bar.*

It hardly need be said that the taking of private property iu order that a l’ailroad may be constructed, is a public necessity. It is urged that the property in controversy was occupied before the proceedings in condemnation were begun, but there is nothing in the findings of fact to show that this was so. Even if the plaintiff' were in a situation to make the objection it would not avail him, for prior occupation without authority of law would not preclude the company from taking subsequent measures authorized by law to condemn the land for their use. If the company occupied" the land before condemnation without the consent of the owners, and without any law authorizing it, they are liable in trespass to the persons who owned the land at the time, but not to the present plaintiff.

It is urged, also, against the validity of the award of the commissioners that it was not made in reasonable time, or the amount of it ever paid or tendered to the parties in interest. Whether this be so or not does not concern the plaintiff. It is enough for him to know that a judgment was entered confirming the award, and the money paid into the court for the use of Pinney and Osborne, aud is there now unless they have seen fit to withdraw it. It is a fair presumption, as both these persons had notice, actual or constructive, of the proceedings in condemnation, and took no steps to review them, that they were either satisfied with the award or concluded they could not make successful opposition to it. This suit is an effort to question the propriety of the condemnation and sale of the property in a collateral proceeding, not by the party even whose land was appropriated, but by a stranger to the original proceeding, who, whatever his motive in buying, got no other estate than the original owners could convey — a fee subject to the easement of the railroad company. The judgment of condemnation in this case was rendered by a competent court, charged with a special statutory jurisdiction, and all the facts necessary to the exercise of this jurisdiction are shown to exist. A judgment thus obtained is no more subject to impeachment in a collateral proceeding than the judgment of any other court of exclusive jurisdiction.*

If it were so, railroad companies would have no assurance that the steps taken by them to procure the right of way would conclude any one, and they would be constantly subject to vexatious litigation.

Judgment affirmed.

*

Weir v. The St. Paul, Stillwater, and Taylor's Falls Railroad Co., 18 Minnesota, 155; Langford v. Commissioners of Ramsey County, 16 Id. 375.

*

1 Redfleld on Railways, 5th edition, p. 271.