MEMPHIS
v.
BROWN

U.S. | 1876-10-01
94 U.S. 715 Supreme Court of the United States (1876) Caution
Also reported at: 24 L. Ed. 244 · 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1932 · SCDB 1876-191
Cited by 43 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court held that a circuit court's May 20, 1876 order requiring Memphis to subject merchants' capital to taxation constituted a final judgment appealable by writ of error, because a motion to set aside an earlier March judgment suspended its finality until the later order disposed of the motion, and the May 20 entry effectively reset the judgment as of that date for purposes of appeal.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice Waite

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the-opinion of the court. '

We think that the order made by the Circuit Court, May 20, 1876, upon the motion to subject merchants’ capital to the tax was such a final judgment as may be brought here for reexamination by a writ of error. The precise question decided by that order had never before been presented in the cause. The city was then for the first time required, in express terms', to subject this particular class of property to the adjudged taxation. The writ was, therefore, properly sued out upon the judgment.

Under the ruling in Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 241, the motion made during the term to set aside the judgment of March 2 suspended the operation of that judgment, so that it did not take final effect for the purposes of a writ of error until May 20, when the motion was disposed of. In addition to this, the form of the entry of May 20 is equivalent to setting aside the judgment of March 2, and entering it anew as of that date. This the court had the right to do during the term, and for the very purpose of giving it effect for a supersedeas. Sage et al. v. Central Railroad Company of Iowa et al., 98 U. S.

412. As the writ was issued on the day of the order, and its allowance embraced in the entry recording the order itself, there cannot be' any doubt of the intention of the court to give the judgment at that time such an effect. Motions denied.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (17 total)

  • Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206 (U.S. 1952)
    …e Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153 (1868) (appeal allowed from a second decree, restating most provisions of the first because the first decree, at the time of entry, was only regarded by the parties and the court as tentative); Memphis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 715 (1877) (appeal allowed from second judgment on the ground that the second made material changes in the first). See United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 533-534 (1944); Hill v. Hawes, 320 U. S. 520, 523 (1944). The suggestion is made that the Septe…
    1 / 2
  • Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (U.S. 1879)
  • Conboy v. First Nat'l Bank of Jersey City, 203 U.S. 141 (U.S. 1906)

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