DIAL
v.
REYNOLDS

U.S. | 1877-10-01
96 U.S. 340 Supreme Court of the United States (1877) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 24 L. Ed. 644 · 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1670 · SCDB 1877-120
Cited by 56 cases

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Synopsis

In a foreclosure proceeding involving a deed of trust, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of bills that sought both to foreclose the trust and to enjoin the defendant Reynolds from pursuing a pending state court ejectment action claiming adverse title to the property. The Court held that federal courts lack authority to enjoin state court proceedings except under the Bankruptcy Act, and that a foreclosure complainant cannot make a party to the suit someone claiming adversely to both the mortgagor and mortgagee, rendering the bills subject to fatal misjoinder and multifariousness.


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Opinion of the Court
Me. Justice SWAYNE

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

The original bill was filed by Lyford, as trustee, and Staatsman. Reynolds demurred. Subsequently Lyford resigned his place as such trustee, and Dial whs appointed in his stead, pursuant to a law of Tennessee. Dial and Staatsman filed an amended and supplemental bill. To this bill Reynolds also demurred. Dial and Staatsman filed another amended bill, and Reynolds again demurred. All the bills set forth substantially the same case. The facts alleged may be briefly stated. A deed of trust was executed by Cooper to Lyford, to secure certain liabilities of the grantor to Staatsman, and for other-purposes. Reynolds asserted title in himself to the property covered by the deed.' He claimed adversely to all the other parties. He had before sued another party for the premises. The case was brought to this court for final determination. It was decided against him. He thereafter commenced another action of ejectment in. the proper State court, which was still pending. The bill seeks to foreclose the deed of trust, to quiet the title of the trustee, to remove the cloud cast upon it by Reynolds, and to enjoin him finally from further prosecuting his pending, action of ejectment. - -

The Circuit Court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the bills. The complainants appealed to this court. The case was submitted here without oral argument. The counsel for the appellants lias filed a brief. None has been filed upon the other-side.

There are two objections to these bills: —

1. The gravamen of what is desired as to Reynolds is an injunction to prevent his proceeding at law in the State court. Without this, all else is of no account. Any other remedy would be unavailing. Such an injunction, except under the Bankrupt Act, no court of the United States can grant. With this exception, it is expressly forbidden by law. Act of March 2, 1793, sect. 5 (1 Stat. 334); Rev. Stat., sect. 720; Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179; Peck et al. v. Jenness et al., 7 How. 612; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679.

2. It is well settled that in a foreclosure proceeding the complainant cannot make a person who claims adversely to both the mortgagor and mortgagee a party, and litigate and settle his rights in that case. Barbour, Parties in Equity, 493, and the cases there cited.

This case was one of fatal misjoinder and multifariousness, and the proper course for Reynolds -was to demur. Story, Eq. Pl., sect. 284 b.

The complainants not having amended by striking out so mueh of the bills as related to him and his claim, it was proper for the court to sustain the demurrers and. dismiss the bills.

' Becree affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (32 total)

  • …ut showing performance or a tender of performance on his part unless such performance has been excused. That rule is universally recognized in this country. See Otsott v. Merryman, 71 Fla. 352, 71 South. Rep. 278; Jones v. United States, 6 Otto 24, 24 L. Ed. 644; 6 R. C. L. 861. The declaration in this case presents the question whether in the case of an executory agreement to sell land the vendor before the date for performance arrives states to the vendee that he will not perform, the vendee may treat th…
  • …nor is a foreclosure suit a suitable proceeding, for the trial of claims to the legal title which are hostile and paramount to the interests and rights and titles of both mortgagor and mortgagee.” Summers v. Bromley, 28 Mich. 125; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Banning v. Bradford, 21 Minn. 308; 68 Amer. St. Rep. 354, note, where the subject is exhaustively discussed and authorities collected; 9 Ency. PL & Pr., 353. Courts have, it is true, been more liberal in relaxing this rule where the adverse claim…
  • Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1972)
    …1947. Act of July 25. 1946, 60 Stat. 664. See, e. g., Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S., at 135— 136; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226. See, e. g., Toucey, supra, at 137-141; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356. See generally 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice 2302-2311 (1965). Letter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 220; NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138. The Reviser’s Note states in part: “The…

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