ALONZO E. GIRTMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alonzo Girtman was convicted by jury of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit aggravated battery and two counts of aggravated battery. He appealed on four procedural grounds, all of which the court rejected as either harmless error or within the trial court's discretion.
The court held that while the practice of requiring witnesses to stand has no support in rule or precedent and constitutes error when prejudice is possible, no prejudice resulted here. The limitations on cross-examination and the state attorney's comment, even if erroneous, did not prejudice the appellant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance request made at trial call when psychiatric reports had been available for three months.
[1] Requiring witnesses to stand during testimony may constitute reversible error if prejudice to the defendant is not eliminated.
[2] A denial of the right to ask specific questions during cross-examination does not warrant reversal if the record affirmatively demonstrates no prejudice to the appellant.
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Establishes the legal standard for the trial court's requirement that witnesses stand during testimony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGirtman was found guilty by jury of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit aggravated battery, and guilty on two counts of aggravated …
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The appellant was found guilty by a jury of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein, to wit: aggravated battery. He was also found guilty on two counts of aggravated battery. Appellant was represented by counsel of his own choosing in all of the proceedings prior to this appeal. The proof of defendant’s guilt was clear and convincing. On this appeal, he does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of the jury but relies for reversal upon four points, each urging procedural error.
Appellant’s first point urges that the trial court committed reversible error in requiring the witnesses to stand. This court has previously dealt with this problem. See Arbogast v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 266 So.2d 161. We repeat the holding in that case which is that the practice is without support of rule or precedent in this state and will constitute error in any case where the possibility of prejudice is not eliminated. In the case now before us, it is clear that no prejudice to the appellant resulted. All of the witnesses were state’s witnesses and there is no indication that fatigue hindered the witnesses, or that appellant was in any way handicapped in conducting the defense.
The second point urges that the court unduly limited the cross-examination. Appellant refers to two situations where objections of the prosecution to defense counsel’s questions were sustained. Without holding that the rulings were correct,' we hold that this record affirmatively demonstrates that the denial of the right to ask the questions specified did not prejudice the appellant.
The third point presented urges that the court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection to a comment by the state’s attorney made during closing argument. An examination of the disputed comment shows that while possibly irrelevant to the issue, it could not be said to have prejudiced the appellant. The comment of the state’s attorney that he was shocked by the crime itself did not carry with it the implication that he was expressing his *382personal opinion as to the guilt of the appellant. Cf. Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 196 So. 596 (1940).
Appellant’s fourth point urges error upon the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance for additional psychiatric examinations. The appellant was examined by two court-appointed psychiatrists. Their reports were filed in the cause and made available to appellant’s counsel some three months before the trial. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny an oral motion for continuance for additional examinations when that motion was presented to the court at the call of the case for trial. See Dupree v. State, 125 Fla. 58, 169 So. 600 (1936); Coney v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 258 So.2d 497.
Affirmed.
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Ronny A. Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…sion to the crime, it is our opinion that the witness’s testimony was in no real sense prejudicial to the defense. Accordingly, any limitation imposed by the trial judge on cross-examination must, at best, be deemed harmless error. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Section 59.041, Florida Statutes (1977). Point VI is hereby rejected. POINT VII WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN RESPONDING EX PARTE TO A REQUEST MADE BY THE JURY. Appellant’s final attack on the proceedings is directed to an…
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Whalen v. State, 335 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…ophesy on ths day of trial the results of the future examination by the third psychiatrist. There was no error in the denial of a continuance. Coney v. State, 258 So. 2d 497 (Fla.App.3d, 1972), cert. den. 262 So. 2d 448 (Fla.1972); Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla.App.3d, 1972). AFFIRMED. BOYER, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.…
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Hunter v. State, 410 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Flowers v. State, 353 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).…
Authorities Cited
- Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28 (Fla. 1940)
- Dupree v. State, 125 Fla. 58 (Fla. 1936)
- Coney v. State, 258 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Arbogast v. State, 266 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)