SILVIO MARTINEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD HART AND TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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This appeal addresses whether a vehicle owner can be held liable for injuries caused by an unauthorized driver under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The court held that an owner who expressly prohibits another from driving his vehicle cannot be held liable for that person's negligent operation, distinguishing the case from rental car scenarios where implied consent exists.
An owner of an automobile cannot be held liable for injuries caused by an unauthorized driver's negligence when the owner has expressly revoked consent and prohibited the driver from using the vehicle. The express prohibition relieves the owner of liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
[1] An automobile owner is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of an unauthorized driver if the owner did not give consent to the operation of the vehicle.
[2] An owner's liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is predicated on the owner's consent, express or implied, to the operation of the vehicle by another.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the owner of an automobile who has knowledge of and gives his express or implied consent to the operation of the vehicle by another is liable for any injury to a third person caused by the negligence of the person to whom he has entrusted the automobile”
Establishes the general rule for owner liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine when consent is given
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSilvio Martinez was injured when struck by a vehicle owned by Edward Hart but driven by Elmer Roberts. One year before the accident, Roberts had Hart'…
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Plaintiff-appellant, Silvio Martinez, seeks review of an adverse summary judgment in an action for damages resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiff sustained injuries when the car in which he was riding was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant, Edward Hart, and at the time of the accident driven by Elmer Roberts. The main issue before this court is whether defendant, Edward Hart, can be held liable for Robert’s negligence through the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
One year prior to the accident Roberts had defendant’s approval to drive his automobile. Two months prior to the accident defendant revoked his permission and prohibited Roberts from driving the car due to Roberts failure to have a valid driver’s license and the refusal of the state to reinstate his license. Defendant expressly told Roberts about this decision; however, Roberts violated these instructions and was driving the car when the accident occurred.
Florida courts have repeatedly affirmed the doctrine that a motor vehicle is a dangerous instrumentality when in operation on public roads. Gordon v. Lee, Fla.App.1969, 220 So.2d 42. As a corollary to this doctrine, the owner of an automobile who has knowledge of and gives his express or implied consent to the operation of the vehicle by another is liable for any injury to a third person caused by the negligence *440of the person to whom he has entrusted the automobile. Skroh v. Newby, Fla.App. 1970, 237 So.2d 548; Nichols v. McGraw, Fla.App.1963, 152 So.2d 486; Hertz Corporation v. Hellens, Fla.App.1962, 140 So.2d 73. If, on the other hand, a defendant owner of an automobile does not give his consent to the operation of his vehicle by another he cannot and will not be held liable for injuries resulting to a third party due to the unauthorized driver’s negligence. Hankerson v. Wilcox, Fla.App.1965, 173 So.2d 747; Fideli v. Colson, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 794.
Plaintiff-appellant relies on the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and Leonard v. Susco Car Rental System of Florida, Fla.App.1958, 103 So.2d 2431 to hold defendant liable for Robert’s negligent use of the automobile. In Susco an action was brought against an automobile rental company and the driver of one of its rented cars for injuries which resulted when the rental car collided with another vehicle. A summary judgment was entered for the defendant rental agency and driver but it was reversed on appeal when the court held that a clause in the rental contract, which prohibited anyone from driving the rented car except the bailee renter himself, would not relieve the rental agency from responsibility for the negligent operation of the car by a person other than the bailee.
The Susco case can be distinguished from the case sub judice in two ways : first, Susco deals with rental cars and an implied consent in the rental contract for the car to be used to further the pleasure, convenience or business purposes of the renter; second, the instant defendant explicitly directed the negligent driver not to drive his automobile at any time. Defendant is relieved of any liability due to the express prohibition given to Roberts, the driver, on the authority of the Hankerson and Fideli cases, and additionally because the driver knew that he was operating the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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The HERTZ Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)…e owner of a vehicle for the negligence of a driver when a vehicle has been obtained without the owner’s consent. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. S.J.G. Corp., 409 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), review denied, 417 So. 2d 328 (Fla.1982); Martinez v. Hart, 270 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Keller v. Florida Power & Light Co., 156 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). This is true even if the vehicle is left unattended and unlocked, with the keys in the ignition. Commercial Carrier. We do not believe, however, that the vic…
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Virgilio Duarte v. Wetzel, 682 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…nothing but questions of law. Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985). Where a person operates a vehicle without the express consent of the owner and contrary to specific instructions of the owner, there is no implied consent. Martinez v. Hart, 270 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Allen v. Shows, 532 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We find these cases controlling. The uncontroverted facts are that Wagner was specifically told not to drive the car without permission and without Wetzel in the car. At no tim…
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Conklin v. Carroll, 865 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…lies on are inapplicable because they involve situations where the owner of the car or truck explicitly directed the negligent driver not to use the car at any time, see, e.g., Duarte v. Wetzel, 682 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Martinez v. Hart, 270 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), or entrusted the car or truck to an employee to use on the job only and the employee went to the job site during nonworking hours- and surreptitiously took the car or truck for personal use. See, e.g., Alford v. Parker’s Mech. Co…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miller v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)
- Susco CAR Rental Sys. OF Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)
- The HERTZ Corp. v. Hellens, 140 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Leonard v. Susco CAR Rental Sys. OF Fla., Inc., 103 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Nichols v. McGRAW, 152 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Giannone v. State, 173 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Skroh v. Newby, 237 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Pietro Fideli v. Colson, 165 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Orange Hayes v. City OF Miami, 165 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Gordon v. LEE, 220 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)