STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN ERIC WOLFE, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed a trial court order discharging a defendant charged with assault with intent to commit murder for failure to bring him to trial within 180 days. The court held that exceptional circumstances—the unavailability of the key witness due to injuries from the alleged offense—justified continuances that placed the trial within the permissible window of "reasonable time" under the applicable criminal procedure rule.
The court held that the unavailability of the essential witness due to injuries from the alleged crime constituted exceptional circumstances within the contemplation of Rule 3.191(f), making the continuances justified and the rescheduled trial date of May 2 reasonable and thus compliant with the 180-day requirement.
[1] Exceptional circumstances, such as the unavailability of an essential witness due to injuries sustained from the alleged offense, may justify continuances under Rule 3.19…
[2] When exceptional circumstances justify a continuance, a court may set a new trial date within a reasonable time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The unavailability of Miss McAdoo, an essential witness in the State's case, due to wounds allegedly received as a result of the offense with which the defendant was accused, is clearly an exceptional circumstance within the contemplation of Rule 3.191(f) CrPR.”
Establishes that witness unavailability due to injuries from the alleged crime qualifies as an exceptional circumstance justifying continuances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWolfe was arrested on November 5, 1971 for assault with intent to commit murder upon Barbara McAdoo. He was arraigned within two weeks with trial set …
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The State appeals an order of discharge entered pursuant to Rule 3.191 CrPR., 33 F.S.A. We reverse.
Appellee, John Eric Wolfe, was charged with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree upon Barbara McAdoo. He was taken into custody on this charge on November 5, 1971, and within two weeks he was arraigned and a trial date set for January 17, 1972. In January, 1972 the State moved for and obtained an order granting a continuance on the ground that an essential witness, Barbara McAdoo, was unable to attend trial because she was then hospitalized in Massachusetts as a result of wounds received from the offense alleged in the information. The trial was re-scheduled for April 5th. On March 30th the State again moved for and obtained an order of continuance because the same witness, although discharged from the hospital, was still physically unable to travel from Massachusetts to attend trial. On that date an order was entered re-setting the trial for May 2nd, a date which was 182 days after Wolfe was initially taken into custody. *204On May 2nd the trial commenced and a jury partially selected. The following day defendant filed his motion for discharge on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the 180 days provided under Rule 3.191(a)(1) CrPR.
The unavailability of Miss Mc-Adoo, an essential witness in the State’s case, due to wounds allegedly received as a result of the offense with which the defendant was accused, is clearly an exceptional circumstance within the contemplation of Rule 3.191(f) CrPR. Thus, the continuances ordered by the court in January and again in March were justified under this provision of the Rule. When such exceptional circumstances are made to appear, the court may set a new trial date which is within a reasonable time. The order of March 30th, re-scheduling the trial from April 5th to May 2nd, clearly met this requirement under the circumstances of this case. Not only was the new trial date within 4 weeks of the previously scheduled trial date (which in and of itself we view as meeting the requirement of being re-set “within a reasonable time”), but also the new trial date was only a few days beyond the date which the court could have arbitrarily set absent any “exceptional circumstances”.
Since we conclude that the trial date of May 2nd was within the period contemplated by Rule 3.191 CrPR, we do not need to consider the question of whether defendant had affirmatively waived his right to insist upon trial within 180 days of his arrest by virtue of commencing the trial on the 182nd day without objection and waiting until the following day to file the motion for discharge.
The order appealed is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings.
REED, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.
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Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1983)…P. 3.191(f); Dedmon v. State, 400 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Foster v. State, 380 So. 2d 1081, 1082-83 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.1980); State v. Rheinsmith, 362 So. 2d 698, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); State v. Wolfe, 271 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Further, the trial court’s determination of exceptional circumstances is a matter of discretion based on the facts presented below. Taiton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 462 (Fla…
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In the Interest of K. M. v. Honorable Joseph Baker, 366 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…ate’s main witness was available and indeed was scheduled to be testifying in the same circuit on the Friday of the week in which petitioner was scheduled to be tried. The State argues that the witness was unavailable and relies upon State v. Wolfe, 271 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), and State ex rel. Fort v. Driver, 270 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). The Wolfe case held the unavailability of a key witness due to injuries alleged to have been committed by the accused was an exceptional circumstance so as to w…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Richard Victor Smith v. The Honorable Lenore C. Nesbitt, 355 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…ble here. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2), (f). See State v. Felton, 348 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State ex rel. Smith v. Rudd, 347 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State ex rel. Canup v. Langston, 341 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); State v. Wolfe, 271 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). There is no presumption that a defendant is unavailable for trial within the meaning of Fla.R.Crim.P. 8.191. If the state seeks to rely on this ground to defeat a motion for…
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