GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
COUNTY OF DADE, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A tortfeasor guilty of active negligence cannot obtain indemnity from another, and a vendee-user whose fault goes beyond merely failing to discover a defect cannot seek indemnity from the manufacturer.
[1] A tortfeasor guilty of active negligence cannot obtain indemnity from another.
[2] A vendee-user of a product is not entitled to indemnity from a manufacturer for damages paid to a third party when the vendee-user's fault extends beyond the mere neglige…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA passenger was injured when a brick was thrown through a bus window. The bus carrier (appellee) had knowledge that the tempered glass in the window c…
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The appellant, cross-defendant in the trial court, seeks review of an adverse judgment in the amount of $125,000.00 entered by the trial court pursuant to a directed verdict on a cross-claim for indemnification in a negligence action.
This is an off-shoot of the case of Homan v. County of Dade, Fla.App.1971, 248 So.2d 235, wherein this court reinstated a jury verdict for Homan for injuries received when an unknown person threw a brick through the window of the appellee’s bus. When Homan filed that case against the County [as the carrier] and General Motors [as the manufacturer of the vehicle], the County then filed a cross-claim against the appellant seeking indemnification. Prior to that case being submitted to the jury, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the appellee herein on its cross-claim. The cause went to the jury on the issues of whether the carrier failed to exercise the highest degree of care, whether it breached its contract for safe carriage, and whether the manufacturer was liable for breach of warranty. The jury returned a verdict against the carrier only and, pursuant to that verdict, the trial court ultimately entered a judgment against the appellee in favor of Homan and entered a judgment on the cross-claim, which is the subject matter of this appeal.
The trial court held as a matter of law that the carrier was entitled to indem*194nity from the manufacturer because it was, at most, guilty of passive rather than active negligence. Florida, like most jurisdictions, holds that a tortfeasor guilty of active negligence cannot obtain indemnity from another. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 45; Florida Power & Light Company v. General Safety Equipment Company, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 486; Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, Fla.App.1969, 227 So.2d 722. The record reveals the following:
On Halloween night, October 31, 1966, an unidentified person threw a brick through the upper right-hand folding door panel of the carrier’s bus, which hit and seriously injured Homan. The door panel was made of tempered glass and the carrier had actual knowledge of this fact before the accident bus was even ordered. The carrier had actual knowledge of the breaking characteristics of tempered glass. In addition, the carrier had actual knowledge that from time to time various objects were thrown at its buses in the area in question.
At the trial, conflicting expert opinion evidence was offered as to whether laminated or plexiglass should have been used instead of tempered glass. The jury resolved the conflicts by finding that the carrier failed to exercise the highest degree of care under the circumstances. This finding was held fully warranted by the record by this court on the former appeal.
Thus, in seeking indemnity from the manufacturer, the carrier stands convicted of negligence in knowingly using a bus with tempered glass in an area where it was anticipated that missiles might be thrown at its bus. There is no support in the record for the trial court’s ruling, as a matter of law, that such conduct was nothing more than passive negligence. It is clear that as between the manufacturer and the carrier the former was guilty, at best, of passive negligence, and the latter was the active tortfeasor. The carrier should not have been permitted to recover from the manufacturer under the circumstances of this case. See: Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, supra; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Federal Detective Agency, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 148; Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. T. P. Herndon & Company, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 196; Florida Power & Light Company v. General Safety Equipment Company, supra; 28 A.L.R.3d 943, 971-974, 979-981; Cf., Prosser on Torts (4th Ed.), § 51, pp. 310-313.
A vendee-user of a product is not entitled to indemnity from a manufacturer for damages the former is required to pay a third party when, as here, the vendee-user’s fault goes beyond the mere negligent failure to discover a product defect. In the instant case, the carrier knew tempered glass was in the door panel, knew its breaking characteristics, and knowingly used the bus in an area where rock-throwing could be anticipated. Therefore, the carrier should not escape liability with the manufacturer bearing the ultimate responsibility for plaintiff’s entire loss.
The jury having absolved the appellant of any liability for breach of warranty and it appearing that the only active tortfeasor in this case was the County, the trial court erred in rendering a judgment over against the manufacturer on the counterclaim. We hereby reverse the judgment and return it to the trial court, with directions to enter a judgment on the counterclaim in favor of General Motors Corporation.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
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Frank M. Stuart, M.D., P.A. v. The HERTZ Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977)…ard Coast Line R. Co. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); Armor Elev. Co., Inc. v. Elev. Sales & Serv., Inc., 309 So. 2d 44 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, supra; Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So. 2d 722 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, supra. It follows that the rights of a party to indemnification will be…
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Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…iable for the death of plaintiff’s minor child on a negligence theory, it would necessarily have been only passive negligence and Dade Wholesale would have then been entitled to indemnification from Aetna. See General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d 535 (Fla.1973). Likewise if Dade had been found liable on a breach of implied warranty theory, Aetna would be obligated to indemnify Dade also on a breach of implied warranty theory. Mims Crane Service, I…
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A-T-O, Inc. v. Garcia, 374 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…rded punitive damages against A-T-O for its negligence. It is clear that in this position, A-T-O is not a passive tort-feasor and cannot avail itself of indemnity in reliance upon this court’s opinion in General Motors Corporation v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Rather, the dismissal of the counterclaim would be, at the most, harmless error. We hold that no error has been shown under the principles stated in Stuart v. Hertz Corporation, 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1977); see also Dura Corporatio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Homan v. Cnty. OF Dade, 248 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Gen. Safety Equip. Co., 213 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- The Great Atl. & Pac. TEA Co., Inc. v. The Fed. Detective Agency, Inc., 157 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- The Fid. & Cas. Co. OF NEW York v. T. P. Herndon & Co., 196 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)