STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, PETITIONER,
v.
JEANNE R. VEENSCHOTEN, RESPONDENT; STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, PETITIONER, V. LESTER R. FRIEDMAN, RESPONDENT
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State Farm sought certiorari review to quash a trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss, arguing that an insurance policy's clear expiration date of January 8, 1972 provided no coverage for an accident occurring on January 30, 1972. The court agreed, holding that the policy duration is determined by its unambiguous language regardless of when countersigning or premium payments occur.
The court held that when an insurance policy contains clear and unambiguous language fixing its duration, that period will not be altered by subsequent incidents such as countersigning or premium payments occurring on non-conforming dates. The Florida statute cited does not immunize insurers until countersigning; rather, it uses 'unless' not 'until' and must be read in proper context.
[1] An insurance policy's effective dates, when clearly and unambiguously stated, will not be altered by the occurrence of events such as countersigning or premium payment on…
[2] A countersignature date on an insurance policy does not alter the policy's stated duration if the policy period is clearly and unambiguously defined.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with the insurance company and hold that the face of the policy sued upon shows clearly and without ambiguity that the policy period was from January 8, 1971 to January 8, 1972.”
Establishes the holding that the policy duration is unambiguous and not altered by the January 30, 1972 accident date.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLester Friedman was driving an automobile owned by Jeanne Veenschoten with her consent when it collided with a vehicle operated by Bryan on January 30…
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These two cases, while not strictly companion cases, present the same issue, and will be disposed of in this single opinion.
Friedman in his suit (No. 72-702) averred in his complaint as amended, that on January 30, 1972 in Collier County he was driving an automobile owned by Veen-schoten with her knowledge and consent when it was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle being then and there owned and operated by one Bryan, resulting in physical injuries and other resulting damages to Friedman; that at said time and place State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had issued to Veenscho-ten, as the owner of the car being driven by Friedman, a policy of insurance, by the terms whereof the insurer, among other things, agreed to insure Veenschoten against liability with respect to accidents occurring by reason of her said ownership, including protection to occupants of her automobile against uninsured motorists, which protection would indemnify such occupants in such sums as they might lawfully be entitled to recover for personal injuries to the owner or operator of the uninsured automobile.
The instant accident occurred on January 30, 1972. The insurance contract attached to the complaint provides for a policy period of January 8, 1971 to January 8, 1972. There is a countersignature date thereon of February 8, 1971.
*202The insurer moved to dismiss the complaint as amended because, on its face, the policy provided no coverage for the accident on the date alleged. The trial Court denied the motion to dismiss, and by petition for writ of certiorari here the insurer asks this Court to quash said order of denial. We agree with the insurance company and hold that the face of the policy sued upon shows clearly and without ambiguity that the policy period was from January 8, 1971 to January 8, 1972.
The law seems universal throughout the country that duration of an insurance policy, when fixed by clear and unambiguous language, will not be altered because some, incident bearing upon the effectiveness of the policy, such as countersigning or a premium payment, occurs on a non-conforming date. See Talbot v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., CA5, 1917, 241 F. 669 (a case which arose in the Southern District Court of Florida); Stevens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Co. of Missouri, Mo.App., 253 S.W.2d 538 (1952); Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 1947, 249 Ala. 294, 31 So.2d 303; Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown (1952), 208 Okl. 317, 225 P.2d 919; McKee v. Continental Ins. Co., 1950, 191 Tenn. 413, 234 S.W.2d 830; and Dillon v. General Exch. Ins. Corp., Tex. Civ.App. 1933, 60 S.W.2d 331.
Respondent insured argues that F. S. § 624.0224 F.S.A. (a part of the Florida Insurance Code) in effect immunizes the Florida insurer from liability until the policy is countersigned, but such argument falls upon a careful reading of § 624.0224. The Florida Statute uses the word “unless” and not “until”. When read and considered in its proper context a different meaning is arrived at from that contended for by respondent.
The writ of certiorari is therefore granted and the order appealed from is quashed and the cause remanded.
So ordered.
MANN, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
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Safeco Ins. Co. OF Am. v. Oehmig, 305 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…the insured). Coverage was retroactive from the expiration date of the previous policy period if the renewal premium was paid within the grace period. The Second District Court of Appeal in State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Veenschoten, Fla.App.2d 272 So. 2d 201, in construing a similar situ ation stated as follows: “The insurer moved to dismiss the complaint as amended because, on its face, the policy provided no coverage for the accident on the date alleged. The trial Court denied the motion to dismiss,…
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York Ins. Co. v. Becker, 364 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…y clear and unambiguous language, will not be altered because some incident bearing upon the effectiveness of the policy, such as a countersigning or a premium payment, occurs on a nonconforming date. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Veenschoten, 272 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). That rule is applicable here. The events in November 1973 did not extend the policy period; neither did they delay its beginning for purposes of determining coverage. The 1973 amendment not being applicable to the Becker policy,…
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Wolfe v. AETNA Ins. Co. & Ricker-Horn, Inc., 436 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…signature may be waived, Meltsner v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 233 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), and does not, in and of itself, control the effectiveness of the insurance. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Veenschoten, 272 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). Agreeing that the absence of a countersignature may be waived, Aetna next contends that because Wolfe paid no premium for the endorsement, the coverage never took effect, citing First National Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Leesburg…
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