ROBERT L. SHEVIN ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
MEL KAHN, ETC., APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a lower court's ruling that a state statute granting a tax exemption only to "widows" violated equal protection. The court held that the classification based on sex was permissible because it rested on a substantial economic difference between men and women, aiming to alleviate the disparity in earning capabilities.
No, the statute does not violate equal protection. The classification based on sex rests upon a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, which is to reduce the tax burden on widows who, as a class, have lesser economic capabilities than men.
[1] A tax exemption statute may be upheld if its classification rests upon a ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
[2] A legislative classification based on sex is permissible if it is substantially related to the achievement of a legitimate government interest.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree that the term “widow” may not be judicially redefined to include a man who has lost his wife since the legislative intent obviously limits the application of the term only to a woman who has lost her husband by death.”
Establishes the court's agreement with the trial court that the term 'widow' cannot be judicially expanded to include widowers.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellee, a widower, was denied a $500 tax exemption under Fla.Stat. § 196.191(7), which limited the exemption to "widows." He filed a class actio…
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Appellants appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, holding Fla.Stat. § 196.191(7)1 invalid as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 2, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, 1968, F.S.A. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const. Article V, § 3(b) (1).
Appellee, Kahn, filed his complaint for declaratory relief as a class action pursuant to Rule 1.220, F.R.C.P., 30 F.S.A., and Fla.Stat. § 86.011, F.S.A., alleging denial of his application for a $500 tax exemption under Fla.Stat. § 196.191(7), F.S.A., and asserting that as a widower he and others similarly situated were deprived of equal protection and due process by the limitation of the exemption to “widows”.
*73In his final judgment, the trial judge held:
“The Florida Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 3(b) 1968, exempts every widow from taxation in the amount of $500.00 without any reference to ‘widowers’, [sic] and this Court is powerless to expand the meaning of ‘widow’ to include both women and men, it is therefore,
“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
“1. That Florida Statute Sec. 196.-191(7) [, F.S.A.,] applies to the feminine gender and is therefore discriminatory and arbitrary and is unconstitutional and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Rights, Article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution, and Florida Statute 196.191(7) [, F.S.. A.,] is inoperative and is hereby stricken.”
We agree that the term “widow” may not be judicially redefined to include a man who has lost his wife since the legislative intent obviously limits the application of the term only to a woman who has lost her husband by death. This definition is in conformance with the unvarying legislative and judicial use of the term in other areas.2
Appellee stresses that inclusion or exclusion from classification under this statute is determined by the sex of the individual involved. While this fact is of significance, it is not enough to declare the statute unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection of the law. Both the Florida and federal courts have upheld classifications determined by sex in other areas.3
All that is required to uphold the classification of widow or widower contained in the statute in question is that it be shown that it “rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” 4 We cannot agree with the assertion that the classification of “widow” is not one which rests upon such a ground of difference.
It has been ably pointed out that the object of the legislation here in question is “to reduce to a limited extent the tax burden on widows who own property to the value of $500 and . .' . thereby to ‘reduce the disparity between the economic . capabilities of a man and a woman,’ . . . .” As recognized in Gruen-wald v. Gardner, supra, women workers as a class do not earn as much as men.5 Certainly this has a “fair and substantial relation” to the ability of women property owners to pay taxes on property of even minimal value.
We recognize that steps have been and are continuing to be taken toward the elimination of legal barriers to equality of the sexes. Among the significant steps toward this end is the legislative provision for alimony and child support payments by women as well as men.6 This provision, how*74ever, provides a means of taking mto consideration the factual economic capability of each woman involved through judicial supervision and control.
Significantly, the provisions of the statute under review do not provide any means for similar consideration. Therefore, until the steps taken toward legal equality result in equality in fact, a finding of identity between the sexes at this time would rest on fiction and not fact.
Accordingly, it is our judgment that Fla.Stat. § 196.191(7), F.S.A., is a valid legislative enactment. Therefore, the final judgment of the Circuit Court must be and is hereby reversed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., ROBERTS, ERVIN, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, concur.
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Osterndorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1982)…estead provisions of our constitution. They are in fact bona fide residents for all purposes except the enhanced homestead exemption. We fully realize that tax exemptions and disparity in taxes are not totally prohibited. See, e.g., Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla.1973), aff’d, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974). However, there must be at least a rational basis for disparities to exist. None of the four bases argued by the state and expressed in Speaker Haben’s affidavit meets the rationa…
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In re Est. of Howard W. Reed v. Reed, 354 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978)…Any classification of persons must bear a just and reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla.1976); In re Estate of Rincon, 327 So. 2d 224 (Fla.1976); Selby v. Bullock, 287 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1973); Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla.1973). Florida’s family allowance statute’s purpose is aiding the needy spouse of a decedent while the decedent’s estate is in the often lengthy probate administration process. In re Sacks, 267 So. 2d 888 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Youngelson v. Younge…
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Hughlan Long v. Dep't of Admin., 428 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…it is an actuarial fact that women as a class live longer than men, the distinction drawn under this rule bears a substantial relationship to the important governmental purpose. Cf. In re Estate of Rincon, 327 So. 2d 224 (Fla.1976); Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla.1973), aff’d, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974). Rule 22B-7.05, therefore, does not violate the equal protection provisions of either the Federal or Florida Constitution. Turning to the estoppel issue, as a general rule, equit…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (U.S. 1971)
- Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1961)
- Wilson v. Phœbe Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461 (Fla. 1882)
- Oskar Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968)
- City OF Jacksonville Beach v. State of Fla. on the relation of Fay O'Donald, 151 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1963)
- Hoyt v. State, 119 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1959)
- In re Est. of Leo Charles Beacher v. Baecher, 177 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- City OF W. Miami v. Isern, 229 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)